

Current History

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Coming Next Month...

AFRICA: THE NEW NATIONALISM

October, 1961

The October, 1961, issue is devoted to a study of evolutionary and revolutionary change in Africa. Our contributors analyze and discuss the problems facing the new states of Africa in the following seven articles:

CONFLICT OF NATIONALISM IN AFRICA by *Hans Kohn*, Professor of History, City College, and author of "The Idea of Nationalism";

THE PRACTICABILITY OF FEDERAL UNION IN AFRICA by *Rayford W. Logan*, Professor of History, Howard University, and author of "The African Mandates in World Politics";

THE CONGO by *Alan P. Merriam*, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Northwestern University, and author of "Congo: Background of Conflict";

EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA by *Colin Leys*, Principal, Kivukoni College, Tanganyika, and author of "European Politics in Southern Rhodesia";

EXPLODING SOUTHERN AFRICA? by *Colin Rhys Lovell*, Professor of History, University of Southern California;

ALGERIA by *Donald J. Harvey*, Associate Professor of History, Hunter College;

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN FRENCH AFRICA by *Keith Irvine*, editor of "Africa Weekly."

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Current History

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The problem of Communist China has been debated again and again in the halls of the United Nations as well as by the people of the United States. For this reason the editors of Current History have prepared a special analysis of the People's Republic of China. Seven specialists discuss and examine the internal position and foreign policies of Communist China today. In our introductory article—a discussion of Sino-Soviet rivalries—Professor Fisher concludes that “the evidence is convincing that serious differences exist within the world Communist system as differences have existed within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and within other Communist parties.” Chinese-Russian differences, “. . . therefore, are part of the larger problem of maintaining the monolithic solidarity of a world system composed of sovereign states ruled by monolithic Parties. . . .”

Communist Solidarity and Sino-Soviet Rivalry

By HAROLD H. FISHER

Visiting Professor of History and Government, Mills College

LENIN always said that unity and discipline were necessary for the success of a revolutionary movement. He insisted on party solidarity before and after the Bolsheviks seized power. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed in 1922, the Communist organizations in the national republics and autonomous territories were brought under central discipline by becoming parts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.). In 1919 when the Communist International (Comintern) was founded, it was not conceived as a federation of Communist parties but as an international Communist party with national sections which accepted the 21 conditions establishing the centralized authority and the principle of the chain of command for each party and for the Comintern as a whole.

Lenin's successors, Stalin and Khrushchev, have upheld the principle of discipline and solidarity to the point where the expression

of disagreement with the party line in congresses or conferences is either not permitted or not reported. All such meetings result in unanimous and enthusiastic expressions of unity of purpose and policy.

Membership in the Communist movement has been no guarantee against embittered rivalries between Communists as individuals or in groups struggling to destroy or overcome other Communists because of different interpretations of ideology, different opinions about Party strategy and tactics, competition for positions of authority, conflicting interests of national groups. National deviations have arisen often to crack the monolith of Party solidarity. These rivalries and deviations have been controlled within the Soviet Union by the summit of the Party which has at its command the state instruments of coercion and persuasion.

The problem of monolithic solidarity has become more complex and more difficult be-

cause Communist parties outside the Soviet Union have, with inspiration, help or sympathy from the C.P.S.U., also come into possession of state instruments of power. The C.P.S.U. possesses instruments of power to impose a certain degree of conformity and solidarity on the Communist parties of the Peoples Republics of Eastern Europe. This has not been easy and in the case of Yugoslavia the attempt failed. This failure was due to a geopolitical situation in which the state power at the disposal of the C.P.S.U. was not sufficient to enforce compliance on the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

The limits of effectiveness of Soviet power in suppressing deviations that threaten ideological solidarity and unity of policy are being tested today in relations between the C.P.S.U. and the Communist party of China. No open break has occurred as in the case of the dispute between Stalin and Tito. But this, in my opinion, is due not to the absence of differences between the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. The C.P.S.U. is not trying to enforce, so far as China is concerned, the degree of solidarity Stalin imposed on the Communist parties in the European satellites and attempted to impose on the Communist party of Yugoslavia.

Does this mean that the Leninist concept of the monolithic Party is being revised? Is the C.P.S.U. being forced to face the possibility that the world Communist movement will be organized around two centers of power, Moscow and Peking? If two centers of power should develop, who or what Communist institution will play the role of Pope Alexander VI who on May 4, 1493, issued the Bull containing the Papal line of demarcation dividing the so-called uncivilized world between Spain and Portugal?

Khrushchev has recently conceded that the C.P.S.U. is not "at the head of the Communist movement" but only the recognized "vanguard" of the "equal and independent" Parties. Will a common ideology (subject to many interpretations) and a common revolutionary goal (to which there are many roads) be sufficient to prevent the development of balance of power politics among the "equal and independent" parties ruling over "sovereign and equal" states?

Is there any geographical or operational limit at which a monopoly of power—such as the C.P.S.U. has used effectively over the Communist parties of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union and not quite so effectively over the Communist parties of the contiguous or almost contiguous satellite states—ceases to function? Time will no doubt provide the answers to these questions. In the meantime it may throw some light on current issues of world affairs to look briefly at the views of the Communists, so far as they have revealed them, and the views of their conservative opponents on the question of solidarity of the world Communist movement. It will perhaps be useful also to examine factors which may influence solidarity, especially between the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. These factors are, first, the national interests of the states over which these two parties rule; secondly, responsibility for ideological interpretations and tactical decisions for the world Communist movement; and lastly, relations between the ruling circles of Moscow and Peking with the Communist parties of other states which have less state power at their disposal or none at all and are thus equal and independent in theory only.

Communists and conservatives seldom agree on anything except their contempt for those whom Stalin referred to as the "putrid liberals." But the Communists and the more impassioned conservatives are not far apart in their estimate of the seriousness of the rivalry and the degree of incompatibility between the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C.

In reporting the long conference of the 81 Marxist-Leninist parties in Moscow in November–December, 1960, Khrushchev emphasized that in an atmosphere of fraternal unity the 81 parties unanimously adopted a statement and Appeal to the Peoples of All the World, in which are "program documents for all countries in the struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism." He also said that the C.P.S.U. "is overflowing with unwavering resolve to strengthen its bonds of fraternal friendship with the Chinese Communist Party and the great Chinese people. . . ."¹

Pravda added editorially (January 7, 1961) that monolithic solidarity is the source of the invincible strength of the Communist

¹ *Pravda*, January 7, 1961, translated in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XIII, No. 1, pp. 24–25.

movement and that each Party is accountable not only to the workers of its own country but to the whole international Communist movement.

Conservatives in general appear to concur with the Communists that the "myth of Sino-Soviet conflict" is indeed a myth and that Communists are united in their aim to conquer the world. They will not be deterred by internal squabbles over revisionism, dogmatism, national deviations, and so forth. They also agree that the myth of Sino-Soviet conflict is based on a combination of wishful thinking and Communist-inspired misinformation.²

C.P.C.-C.P.S.U. Unity

The bases of C.P.S.U.-C.P.C. amity and cooperation are both important and well-known. The following are significant:

1. A common ideology: Marxism-Leninism is subject to different interpretations in respect to detail. Yet all Communists agree about such fundamentals as dialectical materialism; the materialist interpretation of history; the class struggle; the necessity for Communist party leadership, exercising dictatorial powers in the name of the proletariat to achieve the inevitable victory.

2. A common aim: the conquest of power throughout the world and the transformation of the existing social and political order to a Socialist order (such as has been achieved in the Soviet Union) and later to a Communist order (which, Premier Nikita Khrushchev has announced, the Soviet Union is now entering).

3. Common enemies: the chief obstacle to the achievement of the conquest of power in countries outside the Communist camp is the system of alliances of Western, non-Communist ruled states, of which the United States is the most powerful and hence the chief enemy.

4. The alliance of the greater power of the U.S.S.R. and the lesser power of Communist China enlarges the power of both.

From the point of view of the achievement of their common aims, it is important for them both to maintain that alliance.

5. The C.P.C. is indebted to the C.P.S.U. for ideological, technical, and material aid. The C.P.C. is still dependent on the C.P.S.U. for technical and material aid and could not afford to allow minor differences to put an end to Soviet aid as happened to Tito. The gratitude of one state to another is not long lasting and as the beneficiary becomes less and less dependent on the benefactor, the feeling of gratitude is more often expressed by proposing and responding to toasts than in making more substantial sacrifices.

6. According to Chou Ching-wen, a writer in Communist China, one of the basic forces behind Chinese foreign policy is a nationalist trend; one reason for the strength of Communist China's link with the U.S.S.R. is the belief that the C.P.S.U. would not oppose the expansion of Chinese power into neighboring areas as other states would do if Peking were an unaligned Communist power like Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the C.P.S.U. would be greatly irritated and show its irritation in disagreeable ways if the C.P.C. moved to become dis-committed as the Yugoslav Communists did and as the Hungarian Communists tried to do with tragic consequences.³

Origins of Sino-Soviet Rivalry

Matters on which the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. hold conflicting or at least deviating views and over which rivalries exist or may develop are (1) the national interests of the states over which the two Parties rule; (2) the control over the strategy of the Communist parties of Asian and some other countries; (3) the determination of the correct interpretation of certain dogmas of Marxism-Leninism on which world strategy is based; and (4) the problem of maintaining that monolithic solidarity which makes the world Communist movement invincible.

Russians and Chinese have contended for dominance over the border regions—Sinking, Mongolia, Manchuria, the Amur and Ussuri regions and Korea—off and on since the Russians began their eastward push almost four centuries ago. During the last half-century, when Russia was weakened by

² "Bear and Dragon: What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?" a supplement to the *National Review*, November 5, 1960, contains a series of nine articles edited by James Burnham. The experts who contributed to this symposium in general agree with a fellow contributor that "Sino-Soviet amity and cooperation must be recognized as principal and constant factors of the present era of world conflict." Pp. 5-13.

³ Lord Lindsay, "China and Her Neighbors," University of Minnesota, *The Challenge of Communist China* (Minneapolis, 1960, pp. 21-22).

civil war the Chinese moved into some of these areas; later when China was weakened by civil war, the Russians recovered their earlier positions. And still later after the C.P.C. had unified the country and, with Soviet help, had strengthened its power, China recovered positions it had lost.

The present situation appears thus: China has re-established its dominance in Sinkiang; Mongolia, which once was master of both China and Russia and later a dependency of China, is now a Peoples Republic satellite of the U.S.S.R.; Manchuria, another Chinese dependency which the U.S.S.R. occupied after the Japanese surrender and stripped of whatever could be carried off, is again under Chinese control; the Amur and Ussuri regions which Russia took from China a century ago and where they founded the city of Vladivostok ("Lord of the East") are still firmly in Russian hands; and Korea, another Chinese dependency over which Russia and Japan clashed, is divided. The Communist ruled People's Democratic Republic of Korea—the northern half—appears to have been under the efficient guidance of Russian advisers from its establishment in 1948 until Chinese intervention at the end of 1950. Since that time C.P.C. influence has undoubtedly been much greater. It seems probable that the Korean as well as the Japanese Communists receive their policy directives from their Chinese rather than their Soviet comrades.

The areas bordering China in the South present another problem. As far back as the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) the Middle Kingdom received tribute from some of the states of Eastern India, and from other vassal areas now known as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia. During other periods missions bearing tribute to the Son of Heaven came from Arabia, Ceylon, the Malabar coast, the Ryukyu Islands, the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines, Burma, Nepal, Thailand.

The Chinese emigrated into many of these areas. Today 11 or 12 million Chinese live outside the boundaries of Communist China, not including Macao, Hong Kong or Taiwan. Ten million of these Chinese are in the

Southeast Asian states where they constitute alien and unassimilated groups, performing important roles in the economic life of the countries in which they have lived for centuries.

The Russian and Chinese empires did not, of course, compete for dominance in South and Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, with the spread of the world Communist movement to these regions, and especially since the success of the Chinese Communists, the question has arisen which road—the Russian or the Chinese—the local Communists should follow. The local Communist parties owe their origin, as do the Chinese Communists, to the initiative and aid of the Soviet Communists, in most cases operating in the name of the Communist International. Some of the local parties are, in fact, a year or two older than the C.P.C. In some countries in which the Chinese constitute a considerable part of the population (e.g., Malaya, 37.8 per cent; Singapore, 76.6 per cent; Thailand, 11.3 per cent) the membership of the local Communist parties is largely Chinese.⁴

The significant fact, for this discussion, is that in the former vassal states of the Middle Kingdom the Communist movement, which formerly depended entirely on Moscow for direction and aid, has been for the last decade and especially for the last five years turning more and more to Peking for guidance.

Rise of Dissent

Since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 there have been more discussions and more differences among leaders of the world Communist movement than at any time since Stalin silenced Party discussion, 25 or 30 years ago, by silencing permanently those who had disagreed with his totalitarian program. When Stalin suppressed dissent in the years 1929–1935, there was no national Communist party possessing enough state power or influence to bother him. It is true that among the victims of his purges were a great many non-Russian Communists from the union republics of the U.S.S.R. Later, near the end of his life, Stalin brought about the imprisonment or death of recalci-

⁴The estimates of the number and distribution of overseas Chinese are from G. William Skinner, "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 321, January 1959, p. 137 quoted by A. Doak Barnett in *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York, Harper, 1960), p. 176.

trant Communist leaders of Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

But for Khrushchev the restoration or preservation of monolithic solidarity has become a more serious matter. When Khrushchev proclaimed at the Twentieth Congress a new Party line designed to eliminate all the bad features and preserve the good features of Stalinism, he met opposition from the surviving Stalinists—"dogmatists" like Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Malenkov—whom he disposed of without much trouble. The national Communists of Poland and Hungary and Yugoslavia—advocates of revisionism and opportunism—could be dealt with only by force or threats, Stalinist methods which Khrushchev had directly or by implication repudiated.

The Khrushchev reinterpretation of Marxism-Leninism and the increasing influence of Maoism accepted as a modification of Marxism-Leninism (peculiarly adapted to Asian conditions) combined with the increase in state power at the disposal of the Maoists have led to differences. These differences were debated in the Communist press and, apparently at great length and with much heat, at the Conference of the 81 Marxist-Leninist parties in Moscow in November-December, 1960.

Edward Crankshaw, the well informed and experienced writer on Soviet affairs for *The Observer* (London, February 12 and 19, 1961), has summarized an unpublished report on the arguments and accusations alleged to have been made at this conference. In his summary, which has been republished in several American newspapers, Crankshaw says that the report is documented, and was apparently prepared by someone with access to the debates and to the previous correspondence between Moscow and Peking. Like Khrushchev's famous speech downgrading Stalin, this report has apparently been leaked deliberately. The report may not be authentic but its reliability is supported if not confirmed by comments and hints in the Soviet and Chinese press.

There appear to be six major issues of ideology and policy and several subsidiary charges about misbehavior in the execution of policies discussed at the conference. The six major issues are:

1. Is war inevitable? At the Twentieth Congress Khrushchev said that war was still possible but no longer inevitable. He defended this revision of a very old dogma on the ground that times and the nature of war have changed. C.P.C. spokesmen upheld the dogma with the old argument that there will be wars as long as imperialism exists.

2. Will local wars—civil wars, wars of liberation—lead to general wars? The C.P.S.U. appears to regard the danger of local wars spreading more seriously than the C.P.C. According to the latter viewpoint, the balance of power has shifted so far toward the Communist camp that the non-Communists will not take the risk of coming to the aid of those against whom local wars are instigated. The leaders of the C.P.S.U., who are better informed about the non-Communist camp than are their Chinese comrades, consider the risk as serious and unnecessary. Moreover the Russians know that in the event of a nuclear war the heaviest attack would be made on the Soviet Union.

3. Another dogma as old as Marxism, and reaffirmed by Lenin, is that capitalism can be overthrown only by violence. At the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. this dogma was modified to the extent of conceding that a peaceful transition to socialism is possible if the capitalists, in the face of the rapid increase in the progress and power of the world Communist system, realize that armed resistance is hopeless. If the ruling circles of capitalism do not submit to the inevitable, they will be forced by civil war and violence to yield. The Chinese and other Communist parties in countries less far along on the road to communism than the C.P.S.U. cling to the old dogma that force is still necessary to make certain that the inevitable victory is really inevitable.

4. The issue of peaceful coexistence represents a change in tactics from the hard line of the cold war to a softer line which Khrushchev defended as the class struggle brought up to date. The C.P.C. would accept peaceful coexistence only as a tactic to deceive the enemy and weaken his resistance. Otherwise its effect would be to soften the revolutionary spirit and dilute the zeal and aggressiveness of the Communists who have not achieved the position reached by the

U.S.S.R. or have not yet gained control of state power in their own countries.

5. An old issue which Lenin and the Indian M. N. Roy debated forty years ago is how far the Communists should support the national movements led by bourgeois nationalists. The Chinese argue, as Roy did, that such support discourages the real revolutionaries because it seems that some Communists are supporting the class enemies of all Communists. The energy and resources used to support such nationalists as Nehru and Nasser strengthen their resistance to domestic Communist movements.

The C.P.S.U. line is that support of the liberation movements and the liberated countries weakens the imperialist camp and whatever weakens the imperialist camp is good for communism. But the Chinese and the Communist parties which actually rule or aspire to rule underdeveloped countries are bound to ask: "Why not give more help to us, your comrades and brothers, instead of to those whom we must destroy before we can come to power?"

6. Finally there is the basic issue on which all the other issues rest: how to define the present period in Marxist-Leninist terms. From the Chinese and in general the Asian Communist point of view, this is still the epoch of imperialist wars, wars of liberation and revolution. From the Soviet Communist point of view, the struggle is further advanced. Imperialism is in a state of degeneration; Marxism-Leninism is winning the minds of more and more men; and the Communist movement has brought into being a world Socialist system which is becoming more unified, more powerful and better able to defeat capitalism.

Evidence of Differences

The evidence is convincing that serious differences exist within the world Communist system as differences have existed within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and within other Communist parties. Relations between the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. therefore, are part of the larger problem of maintaining the monolithic solidarity of a world system composed of sovereign states ruled by monolithic Parties imposing totalitarian dictatorships.

The C.P.S.U. is, of course, superior to all

other Communist parties in being able to enforce solidarity. It enforces solidarity on the 15 union republics of the U.S.S.R. and upon the satellite People's Democracies of Eastern Europe and Mongolia. But it is no longer able, as it was in Stalin's time, to issue orders to other Parties and expect them to be obeyed on the theory that what is good for the Soviet Union must be best for the Communist cause throughout the world. The theory of socialism in a single country is out of date.

The law of uneven development which, according to Marxism-Leninism, is the cause of the rivalries and struggles between capitalist nations apparently also operates in a modified form within the Communist world movement. The Parties of the more advanced Communist-ruled states favor revision of old dogmas and softer tactical lines. The Parties of the less advanced countries and the Parties not yet in power take a more dogmatic position and favor a harder, more revolutionary line. The Soviet Party is the leader of one of these tendencies; the Chinese Party is the leader of the other.

Differences as serious as these have occurred in the C.P.S.U. and other Communist parties. These differences have led to accusations of collaboration with class enemies, the betrayal of the revolution and anti-Partyism—the crime of violation of Party discipline. In these cases the dissident faction has been eliminated by the Party faction in control of the powers of coercion and persuasion. The fact that the dissidents claimed to have the same ideology and the same goals as their opponents did not save them. There is no such thing in the Communist movement as a loyal opposition.

In the world Communist system no single Party exercises the power over the other Parties exercised by the C.P.S.U. in Stalin's time. No international Communist institution has been created with the power to enforce the ideological conformity, strategic decisions and action programs necessary to preserve monolithic solidarity of the Communist world movement. The problem of supreme authority, so vital a part of the Leninist organization, is bound to become more acute as the national Parties increase their power in the states where they rule

hope to rule someday. In the circumstances there appear to be three possible courses for Moscow-Peking relations.

1. The C.P.S.U. may increase pressure on the Chinese Party to recant, to confess its errors and to proclaim that Khrushchev and his colleagues are "the universally acknowledged vanguard of the world Communist movement"; and that they exercise the supreme leadership of that movement. It is perhaps too late for this. As China gains in power and especially after nuclear weapons are acquired, pressure may lead to a revival of Sino-Russian territorial rivalries along their common frontier and of competition for control of the Communist parties of Asia and of other underdeveloped countries.

2. The C.P.C. may put pressure on the C.P.S.U. to hasten the downfall of the capitalist system by more aggressive policies including the threat of, and where possible the use of force. This would bring the two parties into harmony and put them on a basis of equality. It would force Khrushchev to abandon peaceful coexistence, on which his position as leader of the C.P.S.U. rests. It might bring on a nuclear war in which any survivors or Communist victors would be more likely to be Chinese than Russian.

3. The C.P.S.U., which has already revised some of the most revered dogmas of

Marxism-Leninism, may agree to a revision of the dogma of monolithic solidarity in the international movement. The formula would be to redouble the denunciations of all deviations and reaffirm the contrary principles of monolithic solidarity and the possibility of different roads to socialism. This, as a matter of fact, appears to have been tentatively done at the 1960 conference of the 81 Parties. It would not, of course, cure all the inner contradictions of communism. It would either postpone a struggle for power within the world Communist system or be the beginning of a fundamental transformation of the universal totalitarianism of the Communist movement.

Harold H. Fisher was formerly professor of history and chairman of the Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, visiting professor of history, Russian Institute, Columbia University, professor of international relations, San Francisco State College, and visiting professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley. His most recent books are *Soviet Russia and the West* with Xenia J. Eudin, Stanford University Press (1957) and *American Research on Russia*, of which he was editor and contributor, Indiana University Press (1959).

"In certain spheres, at least, we must reach out beyond interdependence to united action. . . . Should we also attempt to consider a greater political unity or even union? We must try, of course, to agree on our policies and to unite in pursuing them. But if the West were to become as monolithic as the Soviet bloc, we should lose the very independence of spirit in which we believe.

"In any case, diverse national traditions are strong and fruitful, and it would be folly to tamper with the loyalties for which men strive and sacrifice. So when we call for unity in the free world we should not—at any rate at this moment of history—think in terms of a politically federated or unitary state.

"A world government seems far away, even a free world government only a distant dream. Nevertheless the nature of the struggle for the hearts and minds of men is such that no country, not even the greatest, can stand alone. The first lesson, therefore, for us to accept, is that our political ideas must never be nationalistic, in the narrow sense. . . .

"We in Europe will no longer be able to indulge in dreams of self-sufficiency. . . . Nor must we forget that the free world is far larger than any military alliance. There are many nations who would not wish to join us in these groupings but who are nevertheless at one with us in their determination to preserve their independence and their own way of life."—*British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, in an address at M.I.T., April 7, 1961.*

Analyzing Chinese imperialism in Southeast Asia, this specialist points out that Communist China and the Soviet Union have worked out a "double-barrelled approach" whereby "Peking will be free to pursue, as tactics permit, the military and political aggressiveness which has been its chief characteristic since 1950."

Communist China: The New Imperialism

By FRANK N. TRAGER

Professor of International Affairs, New York University

I

CHINA'S MARCH to the tropics of Southern Asia has been long and steady. Under the Han Chinese, Mongols, Ming, Manchus and under the Republic, China has viewed the areas to the south of her borders as inhabited by "barbarians." Upon these people she has conferred the benefits of her civilization and, in times of strength, she has exacted territorial and other forms of submission. The rise of European—Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English and French—imperialism in the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas interrupted China's march; it did not still China's ambition. Under the Communists, China has once more taken up this trend in Chinese history

and has given to it the characteristics of Communist imperialism.

The rising tide of Chinese nationalism after the end of the Manchu dynasty intensified traditional Chinese imperialist irredentism. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese Republic, with almost child-like arrogance, blandly referred to the many states which "wanted to bring tribute and adopt Chinese culture . . . [and] considered it a great favor for China to annex them." He regarded Siam, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet as "having belonged" to China.¹

These trans-Himalayan aspirations of the Republic were incorporated in maps published by the Kuomintang National and Communist Chinese governments. And though the Chinese Communists have after 12 years negotiated a border settlement with Burma and appear to be approaching a settlement with Nepal,² it is all too clear that they have not given up traditional Chinese interests south of the Himalayas and have added their own Communist strategy and tactics to advancing Chinese imperialism.

During 1960–1961, Frank N. Trager was Visiting Professor of Political Science, Yale University. In 1957–1958, he was named a Carnegie Research Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. He has served as Director of the Burma Research Project, Human Relations Area Files, Inc., New York University; Director, Southeast Asian Project, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; and Director, T.C.A. (Point IV) in Burma. His books include *Marxism in Southeast Asia* and *Building a Welfare State in Burma*, among others.

¹ Sun Yat-sen, *Sun Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People)*, trans. by Frank W. Price (Chungking, 1943) pp. 91–92.

² The Sino-Burma Treaty was signed on January 4, 1961. Burma yielded some territory in the Kachin State which gave the P.R.C. a mountain pass access route into Tibet; and exchanged some additional territory in the Eastern Shan State area for permanent possession of the Namwan Tract. The border settlement was not a bad one; it came, as does the Sino-Nepal agreement (see *The New York Times*, May 14, 1961) at the height of the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Communist incursion in Laos. I regard the P.R.C.'s willingness to settle with Burma as a political device in order to show China, while suppressing Tibet and entering India, in a favorable light at least with a small Asian power.

Asia. Since 1950, Tibet, North Korea and North Vietnam are eloquent demonstrations of this.

India, as Premier Nehru plaintively remarked, (*The New York Times*, December 7, 1958, and April 23, 1959) does not appreciate the fact that "Communist China has changed many things done by the Kuomintang Government," but has not changed "the maps" and has penetrated into the Ladakh and Northeast Frontier areas of India. Now, Laos has become the latest victim of a Chinese Communist war-by-proxy which will most probably make that country a Chinese Communist satellite within a short time after the Geneva Conference of 1961.

The Chinese Communists, like their Chinese predecessors, base their plans and advances on the fluctuating course of traditional Chinese history. They "graciously" yield the ancient and no longer relevant meanings of feudal tributary relationships. But the extent of their recognizable aspirations are at least equal to those of dynastic and republican China. And, like their predecessors, they have kept alive the idea of Chinese prominence in the Southern Asia areas in various ways. They recall past glory; they rely on a potential fifth column among sectors of the overseas Chinese; they put pressure on the "undefined" border areas. They turn to the carrot and stick of peaceful coexistence and armed threat; they fall back on the device of training Communist cadres of nationals belonging to their actual and potential victims, supplying arms and military advice. They promote aid and trade to tie in the economies (other than India's) of Asia with their own.

From the time that Mao Tse-tung publicly supported the revival of the "Left strategy" of the Cominform (September, 1947) until 1954, Chinese Communist policy kept alive an incessant political campaign against the leadership and governments of newly independent Asia. During this period, the Chinese Communists added Tibet, North Korea and North Vietnam to their area of control and influence. On the perimeter

of mainland Southeast Asia they also created a series of "free" or "autonomous" movements of dissident Burmese, Laotians, Thai, Vietnamese. These rebel political nests served to harass the independent countries and to probe for soft spots for infiltration and subversion. After the death of Stalin in March, 1953, and especially after 1954, the Chinese Communists have been more willing *publicly* to accommodate themselves to Asian neutralism. This was signalled by Chou En-lai, Nehru and U Nu in their "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" (1954) and by Chinese "reasonableness" at the 1955 Bandung Conference, the high water-marks of lures for the neutralists. This was the period in which their formula stated that "their cause is ours."³

But the Bandung spirit did not last too long. Gradually, in 1958 and 1959, the P.R.C. turned back to a less accommodating posture. At this time, Titoism was denounced as seeking "a so-called third force" in Asia and Africa that would "play into the hands of the imperialists." The P.R.C. broke off economic relations with Japan and openly attempted to bring about the fall of the Kishi government. Tibetan autonomy was militarily suppressed. Indonesia was upbraided for her treatment of the overseas Chinese resident there. Renewed aid was furnished to the Pathet Lao via the Viet Minh. A full-mounted political campaign was conducted against India because of Indian reactions to the Tibetan affair; the Chinese Communists decided further to embarrass India by openly marching into and holding tens of thousands of square miles on India's side of the border. As Halpern points out,

By October 1, 1959, China was thus at odds in one way or another with almost all of Asia; while at the same time making demands on the Asian countries in the name of neutralism which these countries found unacceptable in the name of nationalism.⁴

The policies of the P.R.C., except for the interlude of the Five Principles and Bandung, have increasingly veered toward verbal acceptance of Asian neutralism. Yet a simultaneous, if lower key, approval of "liberation movements," of people's revolutionary

³ For a perceptive treatment see A. M. Halpern, "The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism," *The China Quarterly*, London, January-March, 1961, pp. 90-115.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

movements or Communist parties, exists. Such policies are applied tactically to India, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia. Toward those Asian countries which are conspicuously in agreement with the West, e.g., South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan (the Seato and other Pact countries) and toward Malaya where defense is presumably in the hands of the British Commonwealth, there is unconcealed Chinese Communist antagonism. Taiwan, of course, is a prime target; it "belongs" to Peking. Toward these seven countries and Japan one may continue to expect overt and covert forms of Chinese Communist hostility. The fact that the Philippines, South Vietnam, South Korea, Pakistan and Malaya are ex-colonial countries does not weigh so much as the fact that they have sought their security against Communist aggression by policies inconsistent with the Communist world outlook.

II

But more important than zigs and zags in the policies of the P.R.C. is the basic outlook of the Chinese Communists. Actually, a brief look at recent international Communist policy formulations is a necessary background to the theme of this article. The Moscow *Statement* of 81 Communist parties in November, 1960 (*The New York Times*, December 7, 1960),⁵ re-endorsed the so-called "Declaration and Peace Manifesto" adopted by the Communists in 1957. Thus, a formula has been provided by which both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) may pursue varying *tactics* to advance the course of world communism under a common "Marxist-Leninist" ideology and strategy.

It is not important to decide whether Khrushchev and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) retain the "vanguard" or exclusive leadership of the international "socialist camp" now referred to as "a social, economic and political community of free and sovereign peoples"; nor whether Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China (C.P.C.) have forced their Soviet partners to share that leadership,

⁵ All quotations in this section, unless otherwise indicated, are from this *Statement*. Where Communists use the word "socialist," it should be regarded as in quotation because of its special meaning in their glossary.

implied in the conception (as termed by Italy's Togliatti) "polycentric" communism. These issues are, or should be, of concern primarily to historical specialists and not to those who must understand, prepare and guide policy and action for those who belong in what the Communists call the other "camp."

The public conflict between Russian and Chinese communism which presumably reached its height during the summer and early fall of 1960 has abated if it ever in fact existed. The Russians and Chinese have reaffirmed or re-established Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, depending on one's interpretation of the events preceding the three-week conference of November. What is this ideological orthodoxy? How does it apply to the present situation, particularly as seen in Asia?

The *Statement* reaffirmed the classic Leninist-Stalinist version of the "two-camps" analysis. On the one side is the "old world," or system of "imperialism," i.e., "capitalism," "colonialism" and its "shock force," "fascism." On the other, there is the "new world" or "socialist system." These systems are in conflict but "the complete triumph of socialism is inevitable. . . . Capitalism will be defeated in the decisive sphere of human endeavor" because the Socialist system has become the "decisive factor in the development of society." In one of the few understatements in this paper, and one that unhappily carries much truth, the *Statement* maintains that

Objective opportunities have been provided in the past years . . . for gaining the maximum time and achieving victory for the socialist countries in peaceful competition with capitalism. [These] countries [it continues] consider it their duty to make proper use of these opportunities.

They will do so "with due regard to the historical peculiarities of each country and to the interests of the entire socialist system."

Perhaps, the C.P.C. argued, Khrushchev placed too much emphasis on "peaceful competition." Perhaps, as some Chinese Communists charged, his exclusive and continuing adherence to the principle of coexistence was in the words of the Yugoslav "tantamount to *renouncing* [*italics added*] the revolutionary method [*read tactics*] of resolution of the social contradictions of the

present-day world.”⁶ In any event, the *Statement* clarified and settled the issue. Peaceful coexistence is an interim item or partial tactic, along with Communist campaigns for the “dismantling of military bases,” “general and complete disarmament,” the Chinese Communists’ “Five Principles,” and “mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace.”

Peaceful coexistence means the absence of the big war so as to remove the roadblocks to world Communist advance. Class warfare is *not* renounced. There is a continuing “class struggle between socialism and capitalism.” United States imperialism along with other “imperialist circles” in Europe and Asia are the enemies of peace. War, the Communists declare, is their “constant companion.” But “should the imperialist maniacs start war, the peoples will sweep capitalism out of existence and bury it.” War in this context means the big world war and local wars which the Communists oppose, as Khrushchev said in his January 6, 1961, speech. However, the Communists still recognize “the progressive, revolutionary significance of national-liberation wars.” They will support these wars, with the concomitant advances of “non-military methods of struggle.” In this same address Khrushchev remarked, “We recognize such wars; we have helped and shall continue to help people fighting for their freedom.” These are “just wars,” supported “whole-heartedly and without reservations.”⁷ Peace is a state of affairs which permits the Communists to

advance, utilizing every means including support for the so-called wars of national liberation, as in Laos.

There is a kind of folly, of political madness, which appears and reappears throughout the non-Communist world. Some recent examples may be cited. When Khrushchev sought through summitry and other related devices to cast himself in the image of a peacemaker there were those who breathed a sigh of relief and in effect said, “Ah, Stalin is dead. Here is a realist who will negotiate for mutual security.” The Russians, in the words of George F. Kennan, “are perhaps the people least able to combine with the Chinese in developing the resources of China and producing anything which in a physical sense would be dangerous to us.”⁸ Again, when Mao Tse-tung offered to let 100 flowers bloom in China in the spring of 1957 there were those in Asia, Europe and the United States, who, in effect, said, “Ah, China is becoming China.” That is, China is becoming mellow; its “Chineseness,” to use Nehru’s word, is coming through. While the garden had its short blooming life, Mao was regarded as a potential Tito (though the Yugoslavs, the vigorously condemned “revisionists,” were and are a prime political target of the Chinese Communists.) More recently the P.R.C. has been and is seen as the polarized competitor of the U.S.S.R. for world Communist leadership. “The Sino-Soviet struggle for hegemony in the colonial and underdeveloped world can therefore be expected to continue.”⁹ Presumably, therefore, we should work at what I regard as the prize item in this madness, i.e., we should be kind to Khrushchev and thus split him off from the dreadful Mao!

All such views should have been dispelled by the *Statement* of 1960 and the *Speech* of 1961, by the long history of zigs and zags in Communist orthodoxy since at least the second meeting of the Comintern in 1920. If Lenin could then reconcile his views with those of M. N. Roy on the strategy and tactics of the Comintern directed toward the colonial and undeveloped world, so too can Moscow and Peking reach common understandings. Although variations may exist between Khrushchev and Mao, they may co-exist and they do in fact operate to the total advantage of the advancing

⁶ Edward Kardelj, *Socialism and War, A Survey of Chinese Criticism of the Policy of Coexistence*, (Belgrade, Review of International Affairs, 1960) p. 13.

⁷ The texts of the January 6 speech and the earlier statement have been conveniently reprinted in juxtaposition, *Two Communist Manifestoes*, Wash., D.C., The Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1961. On the “favorable attitude” to national liberation wars, see pp. 51-2.

⁸ Quoted in H. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955) p. 259. For a fuller account of Kennan’s views see his concluding chapter, “Keeping a World Intact” in his *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1961) and a careful, critical review by Marshall Shulman in *The New York Times Book Review Section*, May 14, 1961.

⁹ Donald S. Zagoria, “China’s Threat to Russia,” *The New Leader*, April 24, 1961, p. 18. Some toleration of debate about the tactics to be employed under varying “objective conditions” has always characterized the Communist world. The degree of such toleration before a Party decision varied. Monolithic fidelity was expected after the Party spoke. Disagreement which preceded the Party decision could be frequently washed away in the typical Communist confessional. (This was less true in certain periods of Stalin’s rule.) Now that there is a bloc of countries controlled by Communist parties there is the need to internationalize such practice. Khrushchev’s personality may respond to this in a vituperative manner but he cannot and has not ignored the practice for unlike Stalin, he does not have, nor can he exercise one-man-party rule.

Communist hegemony. If Khrushchev momentarily places greater stress on political and economic forms of revolutionary penetration while Mao adheres more closely to the military and political strategy and tactics of his Yen-an lectures of May-June, 1938, *On The Protracted War*, there is no conflict between them in objective. They are dancing and arguing about the steps in the Communist minuet to the greater glory of communism! And when, inevitably, they pass from the scene, their successors among the Suslovs and Liu Chao-chis will reaffirm what every major Communist leader has affirmed since the October Revolution: that the world, in their distortion of history, is divided into two rival systems or camps; that their world is the world of peace and democracy; and that our world is the world of imperialism and war. Our world, in their view, is always dedicated to the suppression of national liberation movements and always overtly or covertly hostile to the ex-colonial world.

The supposed Chinese fear that Moscow and Washington will reach a *detente* and that thereby Peking's interests will be sacrificed is a momentary debater's point. This has no reality unless it is argued that Moscow is genuinely prepared to accept the *permanent* partition of the world and to "renounce"—to use Kardelj's word—its revolutionary method and goal! What the new *Statement* and *Speech* have provided is a double-barrelled approach to Communist strategy and tactics. Moscow will be free to stress the political, economic and diplomatic maneuvers designed to unbalance the non-Communist Western world, especially the

Nato powers. Peking will be free to pursue, as tactics permit, the military and political aggressiveness which has been its chief characteristic since 1950. Both Moscow and Peking will support the "just wars" of national liberation. Both Moscow and Peking will seek to advance their positions especially among the newly independent, ex-colonial areas of Asia and Africa and among the "older" states untouched by social progress.

The Western "camp" remains the enemy. It must be vanquished and, according to the Marxian dialectic, it will be buried. This requires a steady Communist forward march. In the process the neutralists of Asia have a temporary respite provided they are friendly to the Communist camp, and avoid any action which the Communists regard as inimical to their interests. Furthermore, as events in Laos have dramatically demonstrated, the Chinese Communists and their allies have moved further down the South-east Asian mainland. They can now or soon will control the mighty Mekong and by utilizing the "neutrality" of Cambodia, they will split the area in two.

Burma and Thailand on the one side and South Vietnam on the other are in grave danger.

Chinese communism—as imperialist as China ever was and more aggressive—has been taking advantage of the conditions which have been created in the past years. Meanwhile what is the Western world doing? Are we just confirming an October, 1958, re-issue of Mao Tse-tung's *The Imperialists and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers*?¹⁰

¹⁰ In the March, 1961, issue of CURRENT HISTORY, I have attempted to suggest what we should do.

"While we must keep our eyes on the horizon—yes, on the stars, as Columbus said—it is, I think, useful also to cast a brief backward glance. For a knowledge of the past is essential to an understanding of the present and to preparation for the future. 'The past is prologue' but it is also, after all, all that we know anything about. While excessive loyalty to the past, according to Macchiavelli, may constitute a betrayal of the future, for a nation to ignore its past is as dangerous to its prospects as for a man to lose his memory. Indeed, the Communists themselves state as part of their dogma that they intend to cut people off from their history, to set them adrift on an uncharted sea without either rudder or anchor. Thus, they would be more docile to serve the predatory, imperialistic Communism of the Russian and Chinese monolithic states."—*John Davis Lodge, United States Ambassador to Spain, in a speech before the American Club, Madrid, on April 4, 1961.*

"Barring a major international conflict in the interim, the prospects are that the Chinese representation question will be placed on the agenda of the 1961 General Assembly when it reconvenes this fall, and that the vote on the question of whether Peking's representatives should replace Taipei's in the Assembly will be too close for American comfort."

Red China and the United Nations

By SHELDON APPLETON

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As I was going up the stair,
I met a man who wasn't there.
He wasn't there again today.
I wish, I wish, he'd stay away.

IT is almost a dozen years now since the United Nations Security Council first discussed whether to seat Communist China. The possibility that the question may be resolved in Communist China's favor when the General Assembly reconvenes this fall is very real indeed. In the years intervening, the question has become one of the most ardently-debated—yet, paradoxically, one of the most frequently misunderstood—of the foreign policy issues confronting the United States and the United Nations.

In the course of debate on the issue it has often been contended, for example, (1) that the United States could veto any at-

tempt to seat Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations; (2) that a United Nations seat for Communist China would virtually doom—or suddenly revitalize—the United Nations; (3) that Mao Tse-tung and company see a United Nations seat—even across the table from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists—as one of their main foreign policy objectives; or (4) that American stubbornness and rigidity have been the principal causes of the China impasse at the United Nations. Careful study of the problem, however, fails to support any of these claims.

Even the usual practice of referring to the problem as involving the "admission of Red China to the United Nations" is a case in point. Strictly speaking, the question is not one of *admission* of a new member to the United Nations, but of *representation* of a nation which is already a member. The United Nations Charter itself has reserved a place in that organization for China. The question is whether the Nationalists in Taipei or the Communists in Peking should occupy the place.

This distinction is of much more than merely technical importance. Action to *admit* a new member is subject to veto by any one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In contrast, each individual United Nations organ—General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and so forth—may decide questions of *representation* for itself. It may be that the veto can be used to keep Peking out of the Security Council, and that a two-thirds vote will be required to

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seat it in the General Assembly—though there is considerable legal controversy on these points. In any of the United Nations' scores of other organs and agencies, however, a simple majority of the members of the organ concerned could award China's seat to Peking, if it desired, without consulting the Security Council on this question.

However, any attempt to resolve the China impasse at the United Nations by allotting seats to both Communist and Nationalist China would be bound to run into the "veto" barrier. To bring about such a "two China" solution, one or the other of the "two Chinas" would have to be admitted to the United Nations as a new member, or the United Nations Charter itself would have to be amended. Either of these actions could be vetoed by the Communists or by the West. Moreover, the Nationalists and Communists cannot be *made* to sit around a conference table together if they don't want to—and all the evidence available suggests that they do not.

Consequences of a U. N. Seat for Peking

In the intensity of debate over the Chinese seat at the United Nations, both opponents and proponents of seating Peking have often assumed that the consequences of Communist Chinese participation in the United Nations would be almost earth-shaking. On the one hand, it has been argued—by official spokesmen for the United States, among others—that the seating of Communist China in the United Nations would undermine the morale of Nationalist forces on Taiwan, transform the important Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia into spearheads of subversion, convince the non-Communist states of Asia—and Peking itself—that the United States did not mean to uphold its commitments in Asia, and destroy the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations as a force for peace.

On the other hand, prominent "neutralist" leaders, as well as some Americans, have pointed to the United Nation's failure to seat Peking as a primary cause of the tensions besetting Asia, and have suggested that Communist China's presence at the United Nations would make possible the easing of these tensions and the settlement

of a number of the issues outstanding between Peking and the West.

Neither of these views seems borne out by the facts. Since Communist China could be seated in most United Nations organs without the assent of the United States, there is no reason why this should be viewed as an indication of lessened American determination to uphold its commitments in Asia. Should the occasion arise, official United States statements—backed by appropriate symbolic actions—should be able to make this clear to allies and rivals alike.

Most Western scholars who have seriously studied the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia feel, too, that the seating of Peking in the United Nations would in most cases be of only minor importance in deciding a contest of loyalties which is basically between the host country involved and China, Communist or Nationalist.

As to the United Nation's prestige and continued effectiveness, public opinion polls taken since 1955 in 21 countries—three-fourths of them allies of the United States—show substantial pluralities in favor of seating Communist China in most cases.

According to these surveys, public opinion clearly favored a United Nations seat for Peking in Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Belgium. Those polled in Italy, Greece, Brazil, Austria and the Union of South Africa were closely divided on the question. Only in Mexico, the Netherlands and the United States was there a clear preference against the seating of Peking. And even in the United States, the most recent Gallup poll available showed three out of four Americans willing to "go along" with a United Nations majority vote to seat Communist China rather than see the United States leave the United Nations over the issue, despite the oft-made claim that the American people "won't stand for" the seating of Communist China.

The governments of most United Nations member nations—including key United States allies—have been similarly disposed in favor of the seating of Peking, as the writer's conversations with a number of delegates to the United Nations and a multitude of public statements and newspaper reports

attest. *The New York Times'* United Nations correspondent reported on July 4, 1954, for instance, that Western European diplomats thought it "simply fantastic" that Communist China should be excluded from the United Nations: "If one is to put full credence in the private comments of delegates from other regions, the United States stands almost alone on this issue."

Former United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie confirmed this report in his memoirs, *In the Cause of Peace*. And both Lie and his successor, Dag Hammarskjöld, have indicated their belief that the United Nations would benefit rather than suffer from the participation of Chinese Communist representatives.

But the historical record does not substantiate, either, the claim that a United Nations seat for Peking would occasion a major reduction in international tensions and promote negotiated settlements on key issues. Communist China's national goals and policies appear to be determined primarily by China's traditional national interests and by Communist ideology—neither of which is likely to be very much affected by the seating of Peking in the United Nations. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why membership in the United Nations, which has failed to restrain Communist Russia from "adventures" in Korea, Hungary and the Congo, to name but a few, should be expected to affect Communist China so as to induce it to agree to negotiated settlements, on terms acceptable to the United States, on questions such as Taiwan or as Korea.

Those who expect a United Nations seat for Peking to work minor miracles seem, in fact, to be laboring under an all-too-common illusion concerning the nature of Communist China's policies and goals. Holders of this view tend to cherish an image of a wistful Mao Tse-tung, his nose pressed close to the United Nation's plate glass window, relegated to the cold winds of international isolation outside by a stern and stubborn Uncle Sam, clad in a self-fashioned guard's uniform. In fact, this image would be more accurate if the expression on Chairman

Mao's face were one of arrogance rather than longing and if his nose were pressed to his thumb rather than to the glass.

China's View of a U. N. Seat

Communist China has made it clear in the past decade not only that it will refuse to make any concessions whatever for the sake of gaining entry into the United Nations, but further that it will participate in the United Nations only upon its own terms—which include the complete exclusion of Nationalist China from the organization. The Communist leaders in Peking seem to look upon a United Nations seat as a right befitting Communist China's new status as an equal of the great powers of the West. It is the confirmation of this new status of equality, plus the sweetness of victory over the Nationalists and the United States, which would be the principal benefits to Peking of a seat in the United Nations. The making of any concessions whatever in the process of achieving this status, therefore, would tend to mitigate the benefits of the victory.

Since Peking is convinced that time is on its side on this question, it has no reason to compromise on the issue. Why give the "imperialist" United States an opportunity to "save face" when, in the long run, its defeat is assured, and when it is precisely this defeat that will be Communist China's greatest gain? Thus Peking has frequently reiterated that: "China absolutely will not participate in any international conference or organization wherein a 'two-Chinas' situation may appear."¹

The proud intransigence of Peking's attitude on this question is abundantly illustrated in the record of Communist China's dealings with the United Nations since the establishment of the People's Republic of China late in 1949.

When the question of Chinese representation was first brought before the Security Council, in January, 1950, the prospect that Peking might be seated seemed quite good. Five of the eleven members of the Council had already recognized the People's Republic of China. The United States position at that time was that the question was procedural and not subject to veto, which could be decided by a vote of any seven members of the Council. Trygve Lie, then

¹ Chou En-lai, in a speech of April 10, 1960, quoted by Howard P. Jones, "Is the Tide Turning in Asia?" *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 42, No. 1090, May 16, 1960, p. 785.

Secretary General of the United Nations, had been told that France and Egypt would also recognize Peking shortly; and the Ecuador delegate had also informed him of Ecuador's intention to support a move to seat Communist China.

The Korean War

But, Lie notes in his memoirs, the Communist government chose precisely this moment to extend recognition to the Vietminh regime in Indochina, thus cutting off the possibility of French support, and the Peking official press continued to express militant hostility towards the West. In this context, Ecuador, Egypt and France were persuaded to oppose the seating of Peking, and the Communist government's best chance to gain a United Nations seat was lost. By the time the General Assembly convened in the fall of 1950, the Korean War was in progress, and before the Assembly could dispose of the Chinese representation issue, the United Nations was at war with Red Chinese forces in Korea.

Thus, within little more than a year after the Security Council's initial consideration of the United Nations' "China problem," the combination of American insistence and Chinese Communist rigidity had induced the General Assembly to adopt a resolution condemning the People's Republic of China for engaging in aggression in Korea. Further resolutions recommending that members embargo all shipments of arms and strategic materials to Communist China soon followed.

From mid-1951 until the conclusion of the Korean cease-fire in August, 1953, the United Nations' main contacts with Communist China were conducted over the negotiating tables at Kaesong and Panmunjom. But the United Nations Command was represented at these meetings entirely by United States officials, and the actual role played by the United Nations in these negotiations was relatively minor.

These truce negotiations illustrate a significant fact: that when Chinese Communist leaders feel negotiation serves their interests, their absence from the United Nations will not keep them from negotiating

with Western nations directly. Thus Peking's representatives co-participated with representatives of the United States in the negotiation of the Korean truce during 1951-1953, in the negotiation of a settlement for Indochina at Geneva in 1954, and in direct discussions at Geneva and Warsaw intermittently from 1955 to the present.

In contrast, when Communist Chinese representatives attended meetings of the Security Council, by special invitation, in November, 1950, they snarled belligerently in the Council chamber, refused even to speak to a committee appointed by the General Assembly for the purpose of seeking a cease-fire in Korea, rejected the Security Council President's offer to mediate, and caused Secretary General Lie to conclude that they lacked the power to engage in serious negotiations.²

In December, 1954, the General Assembly asked Secretary General Hammarskjöld to seek the release of a number of American airmen, who had served with the United Nations Command in Korea, and were now being held prisoner by the Peking government. The Secretary General soon journeyed to Peking to confer with Chou En-lai. The release of the American airmen in question was effected before the end of 1955; but the extent to which these two events were directly related has not been definitely established.

Soon afterwards, however, Peking's policy toward the United Nations stiffened again. In January, 1955, the Security Council sought to ease the tensions resulting from the first "offshore islands crisis" in the Taiwan Straits by once more inviting Peking to send special representatives to the Council's meetings. Communist China, however, here reversed its previous policy of willingness to attend United Nations meetings as a non-member. In a sharply-worded note to the Secretary General, Premier Chou En-lai set down the new policy, which Peking has followed ever since:

... without the representative of the People's Republic of China participating in the name of China in the discussion of the United Nations Security Council, all decisions taken in the Security Council on all questions concerning China would be illegal and null and void.

The Government of the People's Republic of

² Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 351-357.

China holds that . . . only when the representative of the Chiang K'ai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security Council and the representative of the People's Republic of China is to attend *in the name of China*, can the People's Republic of China agree to send a representative to take part in the discussions of the Security Council.²

Since that time, United Nations attempts to influence Peking have been fruitless. In October, 1959, for instance, the General Assembly passed a resolution urging that the human rights, and particularly the cultural and religious rights, of the people of Tibet be respected. Though Communist China was not mentioned by name, the resolution was clearly a response to the suppression by Peking of the Tibetan revolt earlier that year. The official Chinese Communist party organ, the *Peking People's Daily*, responded by claiming that the Assembly's resolution was invalid, since it represented interference in China's internal affairs in violation of the United Nations Charter. "The United States may use its voting machine in the United Nations," the *People's Daily* asserted, "to pass one hundred, one thousand or ten thousand resolutions slandering China. They will not do the slightest harm to the Chinese people."³

Even *in absentia* Communist China has played a far from insignificant role in the United Nations' deliberations in recent years. For one thing, Peking's views are undoubtedly taken into account by Moscow in formulating Communist bloc policy on many of the important issues before the United Nations. There is good reason to believe, also, that many Afro-Asian nations consult with Peking before stating their views at the United Nations on some questions. Communist China's absence, moreover, has made it difficult for the United Nations to deal with problems such as the Laos and Taiwan Straits crises, and has been a key stumbling block to any attempt at revising the composition of the various United Nations organs to reflect the changes in United Nations membership over the years.

Most important of all to many delegates at United Nations headquarters, it will

clearly not be possible for any effective arms limitation or nuclear test ban agreement to be reached through the United Nations without the participation of representatives from Peking. These considerations, coupled with a growing conviction that the United Nations ought to be a universal organization, have brought about in recent years a considerable increase in pressure at the United Nations towards the seating of Peking.

The "Strong" U. S. Stand

Despite the unyielding nature of Peking's stand on the question, most United Nations members have been left with the impression, somehow, that it is American rather than Chinese Communist rigidity which has been primarily at fault in making the Chinese seat at the United Nations such a hot issue in the cold war.

In part, at least, this has surely been because post-Korean War frustration and hatred towards Peking among the American people has made it politically advantageous for American political figures to take a "strong" stand on the "keep Red China out of the United Nations" issue. Intemperate statements on the question by United States government spokesmen have contributed greatly to the image at United Nations headquarters and abroad of United States emotionalism and rigidity where the Chinese representation question is concerned.

As a result of this image—false or true—as well as of the admission of almost 40 new members to the United Nations in the past five years, support for the United States position on the Chinese representation issue has declined steadily since the close of the Korean War. In 1954, a United States proposal that the Chinese representation question should not even be discussed was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 43 to 11, with 6 abstentions. By 1959, the margin had been cut to 44 in favor, 29 opposed, 9 abstaining. Last fall the vote was closer still. Only 42 members supported the United States stand, while the number opposed rose to 34 and 22 nations—including most of the new African states—abstained. This April, moreover, the General Assembly failed to re-elect Nation-

(Continued on p. 156)

² U.N. Document S/3358. Italics are mine.

³ *Peking People's Daily* editorial of October 24, 1959, translated in United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Press* #2126, October 29, 1959.

"If the Soviet Union continues to display reluctance to turn nuclear weapons over to the Chinese, the latter will probably try to make their own," writes this author. He warns that "It is of first rank importance for the United States and the entire free world that China should not acquire a nuclear capability. . . ."

Communist China's Military Strength

By ALLAN S. NANES

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IN AN article published by this writer in this journal in December, 1960, it was noted that there is a paucity of information in open sources on the armies of Communist China. This situation has not changed in the past year, and as a result very little that is new has appeared in the interval. Yet the problems of Chinese military strength, its organization, direction and doctrine remain as important as ever. Indeed, events in Laos have highlighted once again the potential threat posed by this massive military force.

Most estimates give the strength of the Chinese Communist army as 2.5 million men, although one source, supposedly quoting diplomatic sources, has given it as 2.8 million. The number of men in the Air Force has been listed at 75,000, the Navy at 66,000, the public security forces at 185,000, and "railway troops" in combat readiness at 78,000.¹

It is of course the army which has the greatest strength and to which Chinese Communist military doctrine assigns the most important role. The army draws its

manpower from a pool of 125 million males of military age who are subject to conscription. Men become subject to military service at the age of 18, serve for three years when called up, and are then put in the reserves until the age of 40. There has been a report that the Chinese Communist government was considering extending the term in the reserves until age 45, but no indication was found that this had actually been done. Approximately 750,000 men are called to the colors each year.

The army as a whole is designated by the term Land Army, which in turn consists of 30 to 35 separate armies, of three divisions each. The army is the highest peacetime operational headquarters, but in time of war armies would be grouped together by region to form what the Chinese call Field Armies. As it is, the country is divided into 13 military regions for purposes of administration and control. Each Chinese army resembles what we in this country would call an army corps, and has a strength of 50,000 to 60,000 men. The entire Land Army is said to contain 102 to 115 infantry divisions, two or three armored divisions, and one or two airborne. The emphasis obviously is on infantry, and this is a product not only of Chinese Communist history, but also a matter of doctrine.

The Chinese Communist Air Force, of

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¹ *New York Times*, December 13, 1960, p. 28. Marshal Lin Biao, the Defense Minister, confirmed the 2.5 million figure on February 18, 1960.

approximately 75,000 men, has a front line strength estimated at 2,000 aircraft, with a total strength of 3,000.² This force consists largely of obsolete MIG 15's and 17's, plus a number of MIG 19's, rated at 900 miles per hour. Apparently it contains no MIG 21's, which are the Russian equivalent of America's F-104's. Part of the force is made up of 500 light jet bombers, which apparently are not supersonic. Their range is limited to about 1200 miles. There are also some Soviet helicopters in this force, and even older mixed Soviet and American piston engined bombers, the latter presumably captured from the Nationalists. A shortage of fuel prevents a high standard of training, but the Russians have shown little disposition to remedy this condition. Aerial photographs have shown that the Communists have far more jets stationed at bases along the Formosa Straits than have the Nationalists. However, the Nationalists are armed with our Sidewinder missile, while the Communists do not possess the Soviet version. So the Nationalists have managed to maintain air superiority. The Chinese Communists have also built a string of airfields in western Tibet, according to reports out of Kashmir.

According to an estimate of November, 1960,³ the Chinese Communist Navy has no operational ships heavier than destroyers. China has four of these, and about 25 submarines, of which six are thought to be Soviet medium range types. In addition she possesses a number of motor torpedo boats and patrol boats. An 18-month old report indicated that the Russians might be helping the Chinese build long-range submarines,⁴ but verification of this report has not been found, although it should not necessarily be dismissed for that reason. There are also 400 shore-based naval aircraft, but these should be counted as part of the total aircraft inventory. Red China also possesses a fleet of 10,000 junks, many of them armed and motorized.

From time to time it has been suggested

that these junks could be used as armed transports if the Communists invaded Formosa. Their usefulness in this eventuality can only be guessed at, although they would seem vulnerable to air attack. In any event, they are not considered as giving the Chinese Communist Navy any real offensive capability. It remains a force that is primarily defensive, ineffective except for inshore defense. Perhaps most important of all, it is led by men who are "generals at sea," that is, officers without any formal naval training. The only up-to-date estimate of its manpower gave a figure of 66,000.

The Ministry of Defense is charged with the direction of the Armed Forces. The Ministry is advised by a National Defense Council, whose chairman is *ex officio*, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic. This centralized administrative apparatus is patterned on the Russian model and is the product of a long evolutionary process. It illustrates how the structure of authority in Communist China changed to meet new conditions, for when the Communists were in opposition there was at best only nominal central control over their armed forces which tended to operate as semi-independent units. It might be noted in passing that a number of members of the National Defense Council are ex-Nationalist generals, but the defense minister and all seven vice ministers are Communists.

A Trained Militia

There is one component of the Red Chinese military forces that has not been mentioned, but is deserving of separate treatment. That component is the militia, which is not a conventional military arm, but a kind of combined military-political-labor force, not unknown in other Communist countries. The militia actually has a legal basis in the constitution of the communes, which provides that all able-bodied men between 16 and 60 are to be trained in the use of arms. Girls form part of this militia as well.

The exact numbers of the militia are not known, although it can be stated that if the ambitious plans for this force are realized it will mean that virtually one person out of every three in China will be a part-time soldier.⁵ If fully implemented this

² *Survival*, Vol. 2, No. 4, July-August, 1960, London, Institute of Strategic Studies.

³ *The Communist Bloc and the Free World, The Military Balance*, London, 1960, p. 6.

⁴ "Substance Behind Peking's Shadow," *Washington Star*, March 20, 1960, p. B-3.

⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, June 10, 1960, p. 4.

could mean that 120 million men and women would have some basic military training, with an additional 180 million having some conception of military organization and discipline.⁶ While these totals are far from realization, the Chinese Communists have officially stated that there are 30 million trained militiamen.⁷

The idea of a trained militia is not new to Chinese communism, for its precursor was used against both the Japanese and the Nationalists. However, it was opened to a mass organization drive during the bombardment of Quemoy in 1958, as a product of Mao Tse-tung's "everyone a soldier" drive. It consists of two types, "basic," and "ordinary." The former are young activists, young men of approximately 16 to 32, and young women of 17 to 22. As activists, they can be used for a variety of political tasks, ranging from outright coercion through discouragement of dissent to positive exhortation of the populace to achieve the regime's goals. The ordinary militia has tended to be used primarily as a work force. Of course, the very existence of such a gigantic force serves a political end; it constitutes a form of subtle coercion.

But if the basic use of the militia has thus far been political and economic, its military significance should not be overlooked. The Communists have argued that they will turn every factory, commune, mine and school into a stronghold in the event of attack, by organizing militia units in these places. Furthermore, since the militiamen apparently receive no special pay, the militia constitutes a large and inexpensive reserve, as well as an unpaid source of labor, permitting the government to allocate scarce funds to needed economic construction. Whatever is saved in this manner can be spent for the modernization of the army, a task dear to the hearts of the professional officers.

Training of the militia is still in a rudimentary stage, and of the 30 million militiamen, only 4 million are said to have practiced with live ammunition. Nevertheless, the basic militia is improving its capabilities as a reserve for the regular forces, and in time will be a source of recruits for

the regular army. While the militia currently appears to be primarily an infantry force, it is not limited to this function, and technical training is slated to become part of its program. Such training will increase its costs, however, and may thus hamper modernization of the regular forces.

Army Modernization

But modernization runs afoul of more difficulties than those posed by economics. What is essentially involved is a conflict of the generations, old officers versus young ones, a traditional approach versus a desire for new methods. The army knows guerrilla tactics, and is considered a master of terrain. The troops can march, they can live on little, they are not roadbound. The army survived for years, staving off the supposedly superior forces of the Nationalists, and its leaders have been conditioned by this experience.

Against dispersed Communist forces, the Nationalists were never too effective. Certainly they could never strike the fatal blow. Though the Nationalist Air Force may have been ineffective, there was hardly a Communist Air Force worthy of the name for most of the period of Communist-Nationalist struggle, yet this Nationalist air superiority was not decisive. In fact, because they triumphed despite superior Nationalist air power, the Communists have tended to downgrade airpower, and the destruction that airpower can deliver. This line of thinking plays a major role in the somewhat cavalier treatment accorded nuclear war by the Chinese Communist regime.

Other ideological by-products of the guerrilla years hamper the drive for modernization. During the period of Communist weakness there was little centralized command structure. Local units operated more or less independently. This lack of centralized authority was to some extent responsible for the self-reliant and democratic spirit of the guerrilla units. But the younger professionals who want to modernize the army believe in a centralized command and an élite officer corps. They do not tend to be sympathetic with the democratic traditions of the guerrilla era, and they appear desirous of attaining the privileges and prerequisites of their military seniors.

⁶ Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier—The Communist Chinese Militia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39, Oct., 1960, p. 102.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Actually there is a potentially delicate situation here, for the growth of an officer caste could pose a danger to the party unless the officers were thoroughly loyal to the Communist cause. There is no point in dwelling on this danger, however, because the Communists have usually mastered similar situations which have occurred outside China; there is no reason to believe the Chinese would be any less efficient. Nor does there appear to be any reason to question the loyalty of the Chinese Communist officer corps at this time. Certainly its leaders are case-hardened Communists of long standing.

In 1958, the government launched a "generals to the ranks" program. It was part of a broader campaign for officials of higher rank and white collar status to mingle with the masses and do physical labor. Colonels served as company commanders, and even as privates in some cases. The government's idea was that officials could not run a proletarian state very well unless they knew from experience what it was like at the lowest levels. The effect of this program on the army's training and morale, if any, has not been evaluated. Insofar as it involved the use of troops for common labor, it could not have been too popular. This has been a sore point with the army, older and younger officers alike. But the state has pressed on with this policy, using regular army troops as well as the militia, and the army has been officially pronounced "both a fighting force and a working brigade."⁸ Although this policy is an outgrowth of China's economic deficiencies, it is also possible that the government adopted it with a view to curbing the separate caste consciousness of some of the younger officers.

The government is also concerned with the ideological indoctrination of the rank and file. There have been indications in the past that the conscripts needed to pay more attention to "socialism, patriotism, and the importance of labor."⁹ No scoldings have been noted from Peking in recent months, so it is perhaps a fair inference that the government is satisfied with its soldiers' ideological health.

Military Weaknesses

If the People's Liberation Army remains a very formidable conventional force, it also has weaknesses which hamper it even in that capacity. Its communications network is poor. Roads are few, and most of them are unable to support mechanized forces. Railroad mileage has been increased from 7,000 to 10,000, but that is grossly inadequate for a nation the size of China. This is particularly important given the marginal character of China's food supply. In the event of war, not only could the movement of masses of troops be blocked, but the supply of food from the agricultural south to the industrial regions of the north, where Chinese war supplies would chiefly be manufactured, could be cut off. The army might be able to live on a shoestring, but deprived of supplies it would lose fighting effectiveness.

Not only would the population be deprived of domestic food supplies, but overseas supplies, from such places as Australia and Canada, would probably be halted. Fuel supplies, which are normally low, and brought in from Russia, would also have to be distributed over this inadequate railway system. Finally, there is the general industrial weakness of China, which should render it difficult to sustain an all out conflict, although Communist leaders are confident that China could win a drawn-out war of attrition.

Of course China is working mightily to eliminate her industrial backwardness, and in the not-too-distant future her economy may be able to support a massive modern war effort. An official of our Federal Bureau of Mines has said that at her present rate of growth, Communist China will stand third among the world's industrial powers by the end of the decade.¹⁰ In addition, in many fields of heavy industry China is fast approaching or is the equal of Japan. Since Japan has long been the first ranking industrial power of Asia, this gives some idea of the progress Communist China is making. Red China is already the seventh-ranking iron and steel producer in the world, and it has been estimated that she may attain third place by 1970 or earlier.

China is also producing a good deal of her own war materiel. According to Jane's

⁸ *New York Times*, April 26, 1959, p. 22.

⁹ *Washington Post and Times Herald*, June 29, 1958, p. A-6.

¹⁰ *Washington Star*, December 26, 1960, p. A-1.

All the World's Aircraft, (1959-1960 edition), China is building 20 to 25 MIG 17's monthly in a state factory at Mukden. According to the same source, she is also producing a jet trainer and a Polish designed glider.¹¹ As far as is known she has not yet produced a nuclear device, although she does have an atomic reactor which was built with Soviet aid.

Nuclear Weapons

Just as the Chinese have not as yet produced an atomic bomb, so there is as yet no hard evidence that the Russians have given them one. Indeed, Sino-Soviet ideological differences reached a point last year when it seemed that the Russians would be unwilling to extend further technical assistance to the Chinese, even of a peaceful form. As far as can be determined, the Soviet Union has not furnished the Chinese Communists with nuclear arms.

It is perhaps because of the very fact that they lack atomic weapons, as well as because of their experience against the Nationalists that the Communists took a disparaging view of the potentialities of nuclear warfare. In effect, the Communists talked big, but hid behind the shield of Soviet nuclear power, relying on an old Chinese tactic of using barbarians to fight barbarians. The bankruptcy of this tactic was revealed during the offshore island crisis of 1958. The Chinese Communists provoked that crisis, but would not accept the costs of taking the islands. The war might well have involved opposition by United States forces, principally the Seventh Fleet, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. Russia, on the other hand, was hardly anxious to permit its own nuclear power to be employed at Chinese initiative. The result was that the Communist bluff was called, and the inability of Chinese forces to achieve the regime's political ends was exposed.

Insofar as the army itself was concerned, the outcome was to strengthen the hand of those military professionals pressing for modernization. Marshal Lin Piao was appointed defense minister because, as a veteran leader who yet managed to enjoy the confidence of the younger officers, he could

serve as a bridge between the party hierarchy and the military. There is little data available as to the precise course of military developments in China under his leadership, but modernization is probably going forward, subject to the strains and difficulties coincident with China's drive to achieve its economic goals. In any event, there have been reports that the P.L.A. is revising its tactics and adopting United States style pentomic divisions.

It is probably wise to assume, in addition, that China will continue to press her Soviet ally with a view to acquiring a nuclear capability. Such a capability would of course be the main objective sought by the modernizers. If the Soviet Union continues to display reluctance to turn nuclear weapons over to the Chinese, the latter will probably try to make their own. It is not outside the bounds of probability that they will succeed, for they are known to have some first rate scientific people, including some trained in the United States.

Nevertheless the situation does point up, as did the 1958 crisis, the crucial influence of the Soviet Union over the course of Communist Chinese military development. Russian assistance is vital if the Chinese are to meet their economic goals, and industrial development is still the source of conventional military power, and indeed of unconventional military power too insofar as a certain level of technology is required for the production of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has been in the driver's seat, so to speak, and from the manner in which the Chinese Communist armed forces have developed, one might conclude that the Russians have not been eager to see their ally develop a real offensive capability. Indeed, at one point last year it seemed as if the Russians and the Chinese were at such odds that Soviet technical assistance to China would be drastically curtailed, if not ended. Such reports have not been current lately.

Nevertheless, it hardly seems well-advised to count on a Sino-Soviet break at this juncture. China and Russia are too tightly bound by a common desire for the victory of the "socialist camp." Neither would wish to jeopardize the gains communism has made by dismantling their alliance. It is

¹¹ Quoted in *New York Times*, December 16, 1959, p. 19.

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"... Not since the Korean war," writes this specialist, "has the Communist Chinese economy been more vulnerable to external events over which Peking has little control than it is now."

Chinese Industrialization at the Crossroads

By YUAN-LI WU

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THOSE who read Communist China's public announcements regularly have probably become familiar with certain practices which the Communist authorities habitually utilize when they are faced with difficulties and failures that cannot be denied or blandly ignored. Vague generalities are substituted for bombastic statistics which, in spite of their shortcomings and with notable exceptions, have occasionally had a ring of truth in the past or, more accurately, of half-truth. The area of omission expands while a few better-sounding reports are repeated time and again at every opportunity. If the current year's progress is unsatisfactory, reference is usually shifted to earlier years or to an average rate which would conveniently conceal the lagging performance of the immediate past.

Setbacks are explained away as the planned consolidation of gains. Policy reversals are discussed in terms of anticipated developments as the Communist party,

which can do no wrong, gains ever greater insight. While one may contend that all these devices and subterfuges are part and parcel of the natural response of persons embarrassed by their own rash and over-enthusiastic advertising, they serve as a reasonably faithful barometer of Communist China's stormy economic scene. Hence, in a way unintended by the Chinese authorities, they serve also a useful purpose.

As one reads the official communiqué of the ninth plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party,¹ one finds the customary signs that all is not well. As reported by the official press, references in the communiqué to the discussion by the chairman of the State Planning Commission on the implementation of the 1960 economic plan were couched in terms of comparisons with 1957, a year before the "great leap" of 1958. Gross industrial output was said to have risen at an annual rate exceeding 40 per cent during the three-year period between 1957 and 1960. Inasmuch as the rates of growth in 1958 and 1959 were 66.2 per cent and 39.3 per cent respectively,² the implied rate of increase between 1959 and 1960 would be not more than 18 per cent which, though impressive enough if accepted at its face value, can hardly be described as a "continuation of the forward leap" in unqualified terms. While steel ingot, coal and electric power are all said to have fulfilled their planned targets, it is by no means certain that official state-

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¹ *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peking, January 21, 1961.

² See the author's article in the December, 1960, issue of this journal.

ments of improvements in Communist China's international ranking during 1960 in the production of these commodities is at all meaningful.

Finally, a very prominent place has for some time been consistently assigned to such natural disasters as droughts, floods and insect pests. These adversely affect farm output and hence the production of certain manufacturing industries as well, in so far as they are dependent upon agriculture for the raw materials they use. Forebodings of the continuation of ill fortune uttered in 1960 have since been substantiated by reductions of food rations and reports of large purchases on foreign markets of wheat and barley,³ which can only be regarded as acts of desperation in view of the consistent policy not to import consumer goods in general. It would appear that a turning point in the country's economic development has definitely arrived. The important and interesting question is whether there is any deep-seated problem that cannot be remedied by a temporary pause in the expansionary process and whether a long-term revision of the "big push" approach to economic development is in the offing.

Perhaps one of the most significant policy

³ A U.S. Department of Agriculture report in March, 1961 (Foreign Agricultural Service, *Foreign Agriculture Circular*, FATP 5-61) mentioned Communist Chinese purchases in Canada and Australia since the end of 1960 at the following rates:

	Million Bushels	Barley	Million \$
From Canada	28	12	60
From Australia	39*	—	60

* Plus 40,000 long tons of wheat flour.

A June 7, 1961 press report from Ottawa put the agreed shipment from Canada at 217 million bushels of wheat and 58 million bushels of barley for a total of \$425 million. These figures may refer to purchases over a three-year period. Announcement of such a three-year agreement was made by the Canadian Minister of Agriculture in Ottawa on May 2, 1961, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of Hong Kong (Vol. XXXII, No. 6, p. 246, May 11, 1961), and the quantities mentioned then were 186.7 million bushels of wheat and 46.7 million bushels of barley, valued at 362 million Canadian dollars. The same Hong Kong journal also reported in its March 16, 1961, issue purchases of corn from Argentina.

As for ration cuts many such reports can be found in the non-Communist press and other publications in Hong Kong in the first part of this year.

⁴ See, for instance, Po I-p'o's article in *Hung-ch'i* (*The Red Flag*), Nos. 3-4, Peking, February, 1961.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, footnote (2).

⁶ There is some doubt about the adequacy of provisions for capital depreciation in Communist China. Intensive utilization of old, patched-up equipment would have the effect of accelerating depreciation and such equipment would have to be replaced even if the new equipment acquired under the first five year plan has a favorable age composition. Hence any reduction of gross industrial investment may lead to negative net investment. This may happen in specific industries even if not in the industrial sector generally.

⁷ Cf. Liao Lu-yen's article in the *Hung-ch'i* issue referred to in footnote (4). Changes in the commune were also discussed in a very illuminating talk by Hsu Ching over the Peking Radio on January 8, 1961.

changes is to be found in the industrial program outlined for 1961. Both the Central Committee's communiqué and other official statements⁴ in relation to the economic plan for the current year have stressed three inter-related decisions. These are (1) emphasis on technological innovation, cost reduction, increase in labor productivity, quality improvement and the introduction of new products; (2) holding the line in new starts of construction projects, plant extensions, and so forth; and (3) assignment of top priority to the expansion of agricultural production as against industry, together with such changes within the industrial sector as would facilitate the easing of bottlenecks in the supply of fuels, ferrous and other ores, construction materials, and so on. If the 1961 program is compared with the economic program of the preceding year, the similarity becomes obvious.⁵ The only exception is the decision to cut back investment in new industrial plants and the much more explicit call to expand food production.

One inescapable conclusion would seem to be the inadequacy of the policy shift initiated in 1959-1960 following the 1959 reappraisal of the results of the "great leap." It is not enough merely to try to obtain a larger and better output within the industrial sector and to make up for shortfalls in agriculture and specific industries which had been neglected or left behind in the course of the unbalanced economic development before and during 1958. Such steps, if taken alone, could be appropriately described as measures of consolidation. But the decision to cut back the rate of new industrial investment would seem to imply that the absolute level of net investment may have to be reduced.⁶ If this is true, not only will the rates of growth of industrial production and of the national product be reduced, but the absolute levels of the increments may become smaller even if the totals can be maintained at their present heights.

Modification of the Commune

Simultaneously with the above revisions of priorities, a most radical change has taken place in the organization of the commune in its capacity as the administrative center of agricultural production and of industrial activity in the rural area.⁷ First, ownership

of farm tools, land, draught animals, and labor power is now vested in the production brigade, which corresponds to the former co-operative farm, instead of the commune as before. The commune, on the other hand, continues to own any modern agricultural machinery that may be available. Both the communes and the production brigades may own industrial establishments. Second, apart from brigade-run industrial enterprises, actual farm production is carried out by the individual production teams which in turn correspond to the former mutual aid teams. However, since the production teams are only "users" of the resources while the brigades are the "owners," distribution of output is in the hands of the brigade. Certain specified amounts of the output of the production team must be delivered to the brigade; similarly, fixed minimum deliveries must be made by the brigade to the commune. But production above quota is rewarded by permitting the producers to retain a part of the above-quota output. Production teams are also permitted to have private plots and to engage in auxiliary activities. Third, in distributing the output, the general principle is to limit commodity rations to 30 per cent of the total share distributed to the individual and to allow the amount distributed in money to rise to 70 per cent.

Furthermore, 65 per cent of the total income of communes which rely primarily on hand tools in their production is to be distributed to the commune members as their personal income while tax payments, administrative expenses and capital accumulation are to account for not more than 35 per cent of the total output. Finally, farm production plans are henceforth to be determined by the production brigades in consultation with the production teams; the communes are no longer allowed to transfer resources, including labor, at will. This can be done only with the special permission of higher authorities.

What the above changes signify may be boiled down to three points: an attempt to provide greater incentive to the farmers, decentralization of agricultural production

planning so that plans will be more in accordance with local conditions, and a sharp reduction of labor mobility. Perhaps the last point is the most important modification of the commune system. The Communist authorities have obviously taken cognizance of the mismanagement of the labor force by the commune administrators during 1958-1959. It remains to be seen whether in taking away the power of the commune to mobilize labor and to make the fullest use of labor resources, the same function, shorn of abuses, can still be properly exercised by the brigade.

The reasoning underlying the new policies ushered in at the end of the first five year plan was fairly simple. The principal tenets were⁸ (1) mobilization of the entire labor force to engage in labor-intensive and capital-saving methods of production so that a larger output could be immediately produced without a vast increase in investments in modern capital goods that would take too long to build or would be too costly to buy per unit of increase in output and (2) full employment of this labor force at all times. These were the basic economic considerations which led to the large-scale establishment of small units of industrial production and the transformation of the co-operative farms into communes. Increase in the occupational and geographical mobility of labor under the commune was meant to contribute to the general purpose of the plan while the "backyard furnaces" in the iron and steel drive and "deep plowing" and other labor-intensive practices in farming were typical attempts to increase output with a smaller capital-output ratio.

Such an approach to economic development might have worked, and may still work, if the implicit assumptions had been, and are, fulfilled. The experience of Communist China since 1958 suggests that from time to time some or all of these basic assumptions were overlooked while Communist party workers and bureaucrats, following instructions without understanding, compounded the errors of the planners with their over-zealousness.

The technical constraints: First, an implicit assumption of the small industry program was that goods produced by the

⁸ Cf. the author's article on the communes in the December, 1959, issue of this journal.

capital-saving and labor-intensive methods would be up to par in quality or at least good enough for certain purposes. When this condition was not satisfied by the "native" methods, the latter would have to be adapted. This led to the development of the small "modern" converters out of the traditional native furnaces in the steel drive. But obviously not every industrial operation can be so adapted. Whenever adaptation is impractical, resources are wasted. Unfortunately, devotees of the 1958 steel drive forgot the common-sense requirement that any product should be at least as good as the raw material used in producing it, especially if they happened to be the same thing. Otherwise, as one author has recently observed,⁹ pots and pans were collected as scrap to make pots and pans, only of an inferior quality. The stress on better quality and technical innovations began in 1959 when the partial failure of the steel drive was recognized. From what the Peking authorities have disclosed, these goals will continue to receive increasing attention.

The enterprises run by the communes and the production brigades may also become more selective in the future. There will probably be more trial runs by modern enterprises for the production of new industrial products of greater complexity. Once the pressure to fulfill the ever increasing production quota is reduced, such quality improvement should be possible and one of the original objectives of the small industry movement may yet be salvaged.

A variation of the same category of technical constraints is that when labor and other inputs are jointly needed in the production process, the intensive application of labor without the benefit of the other factors would also be a sheer waste. The large-scale drive for "deep plowing" without the benefit of better water utilization and more chemical fertilizers was a typical example.

Cost overlooked: When the planners increase labor inputs, they can be satisfied with any small increase in output if the

additional labor would otherwise be idle and would therefore produce nothing, and if its employment would entail no real cost larger than the increase in output. This condition was probably satisfied when the intensified drives were started on the steel and grain production fronts in 1958. But as the farm campaign and the small industry program were unfolded simultaneously, the planners evidently overlooked the fact that the additional labor inputs employed in the new industrial units would not have been unemployed under the changed conditions and that resources could not be properly allocated if this cost element was overlooked. One factor that may have compounded the error was the payment of labor in fixed rations. The absence of additional payments helped to conceal the cost that was actually being incurred.

When the communes were first established, the benefit of greater labor mobility consisted in the full employment of resources thus made possible. But when the highly mobile labor force was shuttled from one kind of work to another without due consideration of the cost in terms of opportunities foregone, the inevitable result was an increasing number of production snarls and unfinished projects. The shortage of farm labor due to its employment elsewhere has been notable, but other illustrations abound. More recent reports on the damages wrought by natural disasters on the farm output have mentioned cases of water reservoirs that were not provided with outlets—an example of unfinished work when the labor force was pulled off to other projects.¹⁰

In his exposition of the 1961 economic program referred to earlier, Po I-p'o¹¹ stressed the need to provide for the repair and maintenance of equipment with the admonition that the machinery industry should gear its production plans toward this end. If capital depreciation has not always been duly provided for, depreciation of the human resources through over-exertion without respite has undoubtedly been even more pronounced. Even though the Communist planners may view the workers only as so many units of labor input, indiscriminate employment of labor entails a real cost to the planners. Labor productivity declines due to over-work. The 1961 policy

⁹ Cf. Ta-chung Liu's paper in the *Proceedings of the American Economic Association*, May, 1961.

¹⁰ See Liao Lu-yen's article cited above.

¹¹ Chairman of the National Economic Commission.

statements speak of the workers' need for rest and sleep. But this has been said before and the result remains to be seen.

Incentive and the wage system: One principal objection to the communes was the small ration distributed to the workers and the insignificant additional monetary reward. The assumption that people will work indefinitely for so little has been subjected to a severe test and has been found wanting. Not only has the egalitarian principle once again given way to payment according to performance, but, as noted earlier, the proportion of income distributed to commune members may be increased for some of the communes during 1961. However, as before, the wage system only provides for wage differentials in a relative sense. The total level of consumption is still carefully regulated. Only the vaguest hint of complementing the justice of payment according to work with a slight increase in consumption has been made so far.

Faulty planning data: As we analyze the course of development that has led to the policy shifts and modifications described above, the conclusion clearly points to certain errors. Specifically, we might even venture to say that the developing crisis has been triggered by the combined failures of the agricultural sector to produce as much as the planners thought it would and did in 1958 and 1959 and of the small industry program to live up to expectations concerning the quality of its output. The area planted to food crops in 1959 was probably reduced because the planners were given faulty crop data in 1958. The current food crisis reflects on the validity of the production and stock data of the Chinese planners. One might of course raise the very legitimate question as to whether conscientious and competent planners would dare to plan with such manifestly inadequate data.

An over-extended economic system: Even a large margin of error between plan data and actual conditions would not have had such a disastrous effect if the Chinese economy had not been so over-extended. The lack of under-employed, if not unemployed, human and material resources in all sectors of the economy made it necessary to re-allocate employed resources immedi-

ately if labor shortages appeared. Faulty planning provided the initial shock that led to the failure of the agricultural program in 1959-1960; the rush to repair the agricultural sector has now reacted upon the schedule of industrial expansion with the full effect still unknown. Fundamentally, these drastic corrections would not have been necessary if the economy were not set at such a high gear. Moreover, official Communist Chinese data have reported the rate of growth of "national income," understood in the sense of the material output only, at 34 per cent from 1957 to 1958 and again at 21 per cent from 1958 to 1959. If the 1958 rate had been less, a lower rate might have been planned for 1959 and the severity of the present crisis might have been lessened. Thus, to the extent that the 1958 output was exaggerated statistically, this statistical phenomenon may have added to the inherent problems due to Communist China's desire to become a major industrial power in a very short time.

The Crossroads

In spite of the radical modifications of the commune system, the renewed emphasis on agriculture and the cutback of industrial expansion, there is no indication that Communist China intends to allow these changes to be more than temporary accommodations to the serious difficulties in which it now finds itself. The desire to industrialize as rapidly as possible has not changed. The massive shift of some 20 million persons to agricultural work since the fall of 1960 may also be looked upon as a continuation of the "big push" approach to economic development so that neither the end nor the means of industrialization, one might argue, appears to have been fundamentally altered at this point.

However, success of the agricultural program is by no means assured while the industrial sector may in the meantime suffer further setbacks. Once the rate of expansion of the GNP has been reduced, two different courses may present themselves. On the one hand, as current investment projects come into operation and the existing bottlenecks are removed, the rate of growth may again accelerate. On the other hand, the agricultural crisis may be pro-

longed and the "take-off" stage may be postponed. A wave of technological innovation or an expansion of Soviet aid may give Communist China a much needed boost. But an unfavorable turn of the weather or some unexpected political or economic "shock" may prove equally disastrous at the present time. In fact, not since the Korean war has the Communist

Chinese economy been more vulnerable to external events over which Peking has little control than it is now. The one comforting thought to Peking's planners may be their hope—better still, their conviction—that nothing will be undertaken by the free world to jeopardize Communist China's much needed breathing space and period of consolidation.

(Continued from p. 145)

alist China to the Economic and Social Council seat it has held since the founding of the United Nations, and recommended favorable Security Council consideration of Communist Outer Mongolia's application for membership.

The Chinese Question, 1961

Barring a major international conflict in the interim, the prospects are that the Chinese representation question *will* be placed on the agenda of the 1961 General Assembly when it reconvenes this fall. It may be that the vote on the question of whether Peking's representatives should replace Taipei's in the Assembly will be too close for American comfort. In the next several years moreover, as more "neutralist"

nations are admitted to the United Nations and as pressure increases for disarmament and nuclear test ban negotiations including Communist China, the likelihood of General Assembly action to seat Peking will increase correspondingly.

If the United States were to declare its willingness to accept a "two-China" solution, while Peking continued to reject this, United Nations actions to seat Communist China might well be delayed for several years more. But even so impressive a display of American tactical flexibility would not be likely to suffice to hold the line indefinitely. For better or for worse, the long and unhappy history of "un-relations" between the United Nations and the People's Republic of China seems rapidly to be moving towards its end.

"If you look at a map of the earth's surface, you will find that only a small portion of it has been economically developed. With the exception of Australasia and Japan, this developed part consists of a narrow Northern belt encompassing Western Europe and the continent of North America. The riches of the rest of this planet have been inadequately exploited. The result has been that the inhabitants of the developed part of the world enjoy wealth and prosperity and standards of living which have never before been attained in human history, whereas most of the inhabitants of the rest of the world continue to live materially in almost the same state as their forefathers did a thousand years ago or more. The industrial revolution which, in the last couple of hundred years, transformed and transfigured Western society has passed these countries by. The population of the developed parts of the world is about a thousand million; that of the under-developed parts about two thousand million. The contrast between these two sets of countries can perhaps best be exemplified by citing their figures of per capita income. The average per capita income of the richer parts of the world is \$1200 per annum; the average in the under-developed world is \$125 per annum. But averages, as always, conceal the true contrasts for, at one end of the scale, is the United States with a per capita income about to reach somewhere around \$2700 and at the other end are countries such as my own which has a per capita income of no more than \$70 per annum."—*Ambassador B. K. Nehru, India's Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, in an address before the Commonwealth Club of California, January 13, 1961.*

Discussing Chinese Communist education, this specialist states that the Chinese are trying to build a "new 'proletarian intelligentsia.'" Yet, "despite the intensive indoctrination program, there are indications that the Communist ideology has not taken root in the Chinese mind and that the 'thought reform' has met with much inner resistance." Will Communist China be able to produce "the new socialist man"?

Education and Indoctrination in Red China

By THEODORE HSI-EN CHEN

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SINCE Communist education is at all times an aspect of politics and economics, any changes in political and economic goals are immediately reflected in education.* The adoption of a constitution in 1954 signified a shift from the temporary stage of the "New Democracy" to a sustained drive toward socialism. Just as socialism became the keynote of the "general line of the state," so socialist education became the new guiding principle of education not only in the schools and universities, but also in the "remoulding" of intellectuals and of business people. Then came the inauguration of the second five-year plan in 1958 and a demand for accelerated production and construction under the slogan of the "Big Leap Forward." There was the Big Leap in industry, the Big Leap in agriculture, and, of course, the Big Leap in education.

To spell out the new tasks of education in the age of socialism and the Big Leap For-

ward, the Chinese Communist party convened an important educational conference in 1958. The decisions of the conference were subsequently incorporated in a directive of the Ministry of Education, which laid down three basic principles of education, viz., (1) education must serve politics, (2) it must promote production, and (3) it must be under the direction of the Communist party in order to make sure that it serves the ends of proletarian society.

Since the issuance of this directive, all education has been characterized by these three central emphases. The three "P's"—politics, production, and party direction—are as important in informal education as in formal schooling, in the literacy classes as in the universities, in the polytechnical schools and scientific institutes as well as the normal schools. No education is considered adequate unless it meets the three basic criteria.

The Communists firmly declare that education has no meaning apart from politics. By political education, they mean not only the teaching of patriotism and loyalty to the state, but also the indoctrination of the Communist ideology and specific instruction in the current policies and on-going programs of the state, to produce active supporters for

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* Articles previously published in *Current History* have from time to time reported educational developments in Communist China since 1949. Other articles on Chinese Communist education by the same author appeared in *Current History* as follows: "Red Education in Communist China," July, 1950; "New China: New Texts," December, 1950; "New Schools for China," June, 1952; "Education for the Chinese Revolution," January, 1957. This article will confine itself to the new emphases and new developments in recent years.

whatever the state or the Communist party proposes to do at any given time.

Education and Politics

Political education is in large part ideological indoctrination. The Communists have unbounded confidence in the Marxist-Leninist ideology as "a guide to revolutionary action." They believe that correct ideology produces correct action and wrong action of any kind can be remedied by ideological indoctrination. When at one time the five-year plan was not advancing according to schedule, the Communists ordered that all workers, foremen, and technical personnel be organized for a few weeks of intensive study of Marxist-Leninist ideas, especially the *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*.

When graduates of secondary schools were found to be inadequately prepared for higher education, the blame was laid on the inadequate ideological level of the teachers, and the proposed remedy was to give the teachers a stronger dose of ideological indoctrination in the summer. When doctors, engineers, architects and other professional personnel did not measure up to the Communist standards of work, they were also required to take up more ideological study. More recently, when complaint was heard that food in the public mess halls was not popular with the people, the Communists, again guided by their superstitious belief in the efficacy of their ideology, decided that what the cooks needed was a more systematic indoctrination in proletarian ideology.

With such an unbounded faith in ideology, it is no wonder that ideological indoctrination is given a central place in every educational program. Even in literacy classes and the primary schools, reading and writing are considered secondary to the inculcation of the "proletarian viewpoint." Political or ideological education may begin with the study of current events or of government reports or the speeches of prominent Communist leaders. From the beginning, the concept of the class struggle is emphasized and pupils are taught to analyze the class differentiations in Chinese society and in the world today. In the secondary and higher schools, more formal studies of Marxism-Leninism are introduced and such subjects as "Dialec-

tical Materialism," "Foundations of Marxism-Leninism," "Socialism and Communism," and so on, are designed to raise ideological education to higher levels of theoretical understanding.

Political education, however, does not stop with classroom study. It is not satisfied with knowledge or understanding alone. It demands that ideological conversion must be tested and proven in what the Communists call "revolutionary action." Important as it is for people to know that all history is the story of the class struggle and that the proletarian revolution is a bitter class struggle against the bourgeois and feudal elements, their "class consciousness" must still be considered inadequate until they have plunged themselves into the on-going struggle and learned to be "valiant warriors" in fighting against all forms of feudalism and "bureaucratic capitalism" at home and abroad.

Consequently, participation in various "mass campaigns" is deemed an essential part of political education. Among such mass campaigns are the land reform, which is essentially a class struggle against the landlords, and the anti-bourgeoisie campaign in the cities. The anti-American campaign is, in a way, an extension of the same kind of struggle beyond the national borders—in other words, class struggle on an international scale. Students and teachers are required to take part in these campaigns; the more vigorous their participation, the more they are accepted as "activists" or "progressive elements."

Classes in schools are frequently dismissed to encourage participation in the mass campaigns. At any given time, the Communist party issues to the schools a list of the political activities considered to be of value to students in their political education. Such political activities range from participation in mass demonstrations to shouting slogans in parades, from digging canals or laboring in dam construction to a concerted mass attack on flies and mosquitoes. Or they may consist of helping the state and Party ferret out "counter-revolutionary elements" and "anti-Party ideas" in their schools, in their homes, and in society at large.

This means, of course, frequent interruptions and a good deal of instability in education. But the Communists are proud of the

fact that their school is an integral part of social life and there is no gap between school and society. Moreover, they maintain that any advance in ideological conversion or in the "political consciousness" of the students must be considered as an educational gain just as important (if not more so) as progress in academic subjects. For the schools, as well as for the factories, the farms, the government offices and the various professions, the constantly repeated slogan is that "politics must take command."

In other words, the political consideration must take precedence over all other considerations. For this reason, pupils who are judged academically inferior by their teachers have been promoted and rewarded honors by virtue of their political qualifications and "revolutionary fervor." On the other hand, academic ability unaccompanied by political reliability does not win recognition in Communist China.

A major method of political education is what the Communists call "criticism and self-criticism." It is the method of using group pressure on the individual. It attempts to obtain conformity without the employment of physical force or direct coercion. In small groups in which the individual comes into intimate contact with his fellow men, he is asked to express his views in regard to various matters, to bring out into the open his inner thoughts in regard to the Communist party and the policies of the new state, to criticize the views and ideological shortcomings of other members of his group, and to pinpoint his own past and present shortcomings. The process is repeated day in and day out; any discrepancy between earlier and later statements are immediately taken up for further questioning and clarification. This is the inquisitorial process known as "thought reform" or "ideological remoulding," or what writers in this country popularly refer to as "brainwashing." Confessions and vigorous declarations of absolute obeisance to the Communist party and the proletarian cause are expected as indications that ideological remoulding has taken effect.

Education and Production

Labor and production have always been stressed in Communist education, but since 1958 the combination of education with

productive labor has been given a fresh emphasis. The Communists frequently quote Mao Tse-tung's statement that all human knowledge falls under two categories, viz., knowledge pertaining to the class struggle and knowledge pertaining to the production struggle. The systematization of the former has produced the social sciences, and the latter has given rise to the natural sciences, while philosophy represents the summation of the two areas of knowledge. Inasmuch as the study of the class struggle comes under political education, the remaining task of education must, therefore, be the teaching of knowledge and skills that have to do with production. Any teaching or learning not directly related to politics or production is condemned as "bourgeois" bookishness that has no place in proletarian education.

Just as political education must provide for "revolutionary action" to go with theoretical study, so education for production must provide for actual experience in production along with the acquisition of knowledge. To facilitate the integration of actual production with study, the government has ordered that all schools and universities should establish farms, factories, and numerous other forms of productive enterprises so that students can work in them and contribute directly to the production program of the state. The number and variety of these productive enterprises are truly amazing. There are workshops of various kinds, engineering firms, architectural offices, department stores, machine shops, paper mills, and plants for the manufacture of electrical appliances, medical apparatuses, precision instruments, drugs, chemicals, and what not.

These productive enterprises are not merely laboratories or student workshops. They are regular production units taking and fulfilling orders on a business basis just like regular factories and farms. One group of college students contracted for the construction of a small railway; another built an airplane for commercial use. A large university would have hundreds of various production enterprises carried on by its students. Even elementary schools have their own farms and factories.

From the Communist point of view, this combination of education with productive labor not only has brought about a vast in-

crease in the productive force of the land, but also holds important implications for educational theory. Education is no longer divorced from the practical affairs of life. "Education for its own sake" or the ivory tower concept of education has been replaced by education for politics and for production. Theory is held to be useless unless it is directly applicable to practice.

There are three major types of schools in China today: the spare-time school, the part-time school, and the full-time school. Spare-time education is, in essence, adult education. Peasants attend schools in their off season and workers attend after their day's work. Spare-time education, therefore, does not interfere with production activities. There are also spare-time normal schools to engage teachers in study without interruption of their teaching duties. There are spare-time secondary schools and "spare-time colleges and universities" as well as spare-time literacy classes and elementary schools.

While spare-time education is subordinate to production, part-time education attempts to pay equal attention to production and study. Students divide their time between work and study. There are many different patterns of work-study programs. In some cases, half day is given to study and half day to work; in other cases, work and study are scheduled for alternate days or alternate periods of time ranging from days to weeks.

In the full-time schools, the major concern of the students is study. Even here, however, knowledge is supposed to be closely integrated with the actual problems of production and of present-day politics. The establishment of farms, factories, and other production enterprises is as important for the full-time schools as for the part-time schools. In all cases, work is an integral part of education.

The establishment of production enterprises by educational institutions is only a part of the story. While schools and universities are being turned into "centers of production" as well as "centers of learning," farms and factories and large business enterprises have been ordered to establish schools on ascending levels for peasants, workers, and their families. The most elaborate system of such schools has been established by

the communes, some of which have set up complete systems from the elementary schools to higher institutions. Many of them are spare-time schools. In this manner, centers of production have also become centers of learning.

Education under Party Direction

Education in Communist China is directly controlled by the Communist party. The Ministry of Education and other government agencies of educational administration carry out the policies set forth by the Communist party. Whenever big plans or changes in education are contemplated, the first announcement usually comes from the propaganda chief of the Party rather than from the Ministry of Education or even the Prime Minister. This is an indication not only of the Party's control of education, but also the frank identification of education with propaganda. Explaining the indivisibility of the three cardinal principles of education promulgated in 1958, the propaganda chief of the Party (Lu Ting-yi by name) said: "Education must serve politics, must be combined with productive labor, and must be led by the Party—these three things are inter-related."

Actually, control by the Party is the key to the entire educational program. The Party, it is maintained, knows best what is good for China and the Chinese people. The Party alone has full knowledge of the political objectives, the economic plans, and the general goals of the proletarian revolution. The Party, therefore, has the responsibility not only of determining the objectives of education but also of supervising the work of the schools, the teachers, and the students to make sure that education serves the interests of proletarian education.

Every form of education, be it the program of a regular school or the spare-time education for, say, the crew of a Yangtze steamer, is directly supervised and controlled by a person appointed by the Party and representing the authority of the Party. In every school or university, the real authority is not the principal or the titular head of the school, but the resident Party commissioner who represents the "Party leadership." His word is law. Any teacher, student or administrator who incurs his displeasure may

be accused of "disobeying the leadership," and disobedience to the Party is a very serious offense.

The Party commissioner controls the appointment and promotion of teachers. He supervises the program of political education and the process of thought reform. He reports to the Party organization whether teachers are making satisfactory progress in "ideological remoulding." In rewarding scholarships to students or even recommending them for graduation, his views carry so much weight that they may overrule the decisions of the faculty. He examines the syllabuses and lesson plans of the teachers. When he finds that a teacher uses American teaching materials instead of Soviet materials, he promptly exercises the authority of the "leadership" and demands a change and, if necessary, a confession of addiction to "bourgeois ideology." Party commissioners have been known to interfere actively in fields of study in which they have no competence at all. Nevertheless, they are the symbol of the "Party leadership" which is considered absolutely essential to education in China.

The Party commissioner directs the life of the whole school. He coordinates the activities of the Communist youth organizations, which play a leading role in school life. He sees to it that students and teachers take part faithfully in approved "political tasks." Such tasks may be in the form of mass campaigns earlier mentioned in this paper, or they may even be personal errands for the commissioner.

Much stress is laid on Communist morality. The essence of Communist morality, it is said, is that the individual must always put the interests of the whole above the interests of the part, the interests of the group above those of the individual, and the interests of the proletarian revolution above all else. Communist morality recognizes loyalty to the Party and the proletarian revolution as the supreme loyalty superseding all else. It demands that the individual must at all times be ready to sacrifice his personal advantages for the good of the revolution or "the people." Since the Communist party is the standard-bearer of the proletarian revolution and the symbol of "the people," the essence of Communist morality is to be absolutely loyal and obedient to the Party.

Relatively few people belong to the Communist party, which carefully screens all applicants and admits only those it is absolutely sure of. But the obligation of obeying the Party is imposed on the entire population. The climax of "ideological remoulding" for intellectuals is a pledge of "heart surrender" in which they declare that they surrender their whole heart without reservation to the Communist party. Teachers, of course, are expected to make this pledge.

Students, too, are taught that obedience to the Party is the highest virtue. It is constantly preached to the young people that the primary purpose of their study is not to pursue personal interests nor to seek personal advancement, but to be enabled better to serve the Party and the state. They are directed into courses of study most needed in the program of national construction at the moment, and upon completion of their study they are asked to take up any job assigned to them by the Party or the state. Every year, a campaign is launched among the graduating seniors of secondary schools and higher institutions to get every person to sign a pledge to accept any position assigned to him, no matter how distant from home or from personal desires. Personal plans are of no account; the call of the Party must be heeded.

Young people who have shown "progressive" tendencies and who have taken an active part in "revolutionary activities" are recruited to join the Communist Youth League; those of younger age enlist for membership in the Young Pioneers organization. Within the youth organizations, the process of "remoulding" the character of youth is intensified. A special journal titled *Chinese Youth* takes up the problems of youth and instructs how youth should behave in various situations. Young people are told that they should seek the counsel of the Party in all matters, personal or social or vocational or political. Even in such matters as family relations and love and romance, young people are told that the interests of the revolution must be given primary consideration and the viewpoint of the Party must be the guide. Many a young man or woman has been persuaded either to defer marriage or to give up a lover in deference to the views of the "organization," which is another term used to

describe the Party as the acme of "collective living."

Big Plans, Bold Changes

Education is far from universal and illiteracy is still high. But there is no doubt that marked progress has been made in the extension of education to more and more people. School statistics tell only a part of the story, because there is much education—in doctrination and propaganda, to be sure—carried on by the varied media of communications and myriad forms of informal education.

A distinguishing characteristic of the Communist school system is the importance attached to adult education. Schools for adults are considered an integral part of the school system. There are many types of educational facilities for adults, ranging from museum exhibits and popular lectures to organized classes running the whole gamut of elementary, secondary and higher education. Special attention is given to workers and peasants, partly because they constitute the bulk of the illiterate population, and partly because the Communists in their ideology have always called the workers and peasants the backbone of the proletarian revolution.

Spare-time schools for workers and peasants provide abbreviated courses which enable them to cover the ground of the elementary and secondary schools in half the number of years normally required for such schooling, even though they attend in their spare-time only. It is claimed that the "revolutionary fervor" and production experience of workers and peasants enable them to achieve more in shorter time, and consequently within the period of a few years they are able to rise from illiteracy to higher education. It was reported in the spring of 1960 that more than 150 million workers and peasants were enrolled in spare-time schools of various grades, among whom were some 370,000 in spare-time "colleges and universities." The latter, of course, are very different from the regular institutions of higher learning. Thousands of them sprang up in the short period of a few months to provide more advanced instruction to those who in their spare-time study had acquired what was roughly considered the "equivalent" of elementary and secondary education.

Energetic effort is being made to reduce illiteracy. The plan is to concentrate first on the cadres of the various branches of the government, on the workers in the factories, the mines, and industrial enterprises, and subsequently on the bulk of the rural and urban population between 14 and 50 years of age. Such literacy objectives are to be "basically" (meaning "approximately" or "generally speaking") attained in the next five years or so, according to the announced schedule.

Bold departures from the past are seen in the types of schools, in the concept of education, and in educational methods and objectives. To popularize education, the Communists have set out to simplify the Chinese written language. Their aim is to "Latinize" the written language by the adoption of an alphabet, leaving the traditional Chinese writing to the specialized study of scholars. At this time, however, they realize that it is not yet possible to dispense with the Chinese written characters. They have, however, greatly simplified the complicated characters and issued official lists of characters in greatly simplified forms. Such forms, i.e., simplified characters, are used in printing and writing so that a Chinese not in touch with the reform would find many words in a Chinese Communist newspaper or periodical today which he could not easily identify. They are, however, easier for the beginning learner.

Ambitious plans have been laid out. They call for universal primary education in the next few years, the enlistment of most children of pre-school age in nurseries and kindergartens, and secondary education for all who desire it. They even call for the "popularization of higher education" with a view to making it "universal" in 15 years.

At the present time, the Communists are more concerned with quantitative growth. Sometimes they say that their immediate task must be to provide some kind of education, no matter how superficial and elementary, for the many, and that they will try to raise quality later on. At other times, they ridicule the "bourgeois concept of education standards" and maintain that the new schools have high standards in terms of political competence and production technique.

On the other hand, they seem to be aware of the fact that there is an urgent need in the country for trained personnel in numerous

and varied fields, and that training beyond the elementary level requires the background of good systematic study not entirely different from "bourgeois standards of scholarship." So every now and then they turn to the schools and universities and demand a higher quality of work. This, they maintain, should be done without reducing the hours required for productive labor and political work. Under the Socialist system, they say, it is possible to accomplish what is impossible under the capitalist system.

The study of science and technology is considered to be of first importance, not only because they are urgently needed for the ambitious plans of industrialization but also because the Communists claim that their ideology of Marxist materialism rests on a scientific basis. The newspapers and periodicals contain much publicity on the current campaign for technical improvements and the invention of new tools and mechanical devices. These, we are told, add up to a "technical revolution" in China today.

Here, as elsewhere, the approach is, in the main, utilitarian. The Communists insist that all theory must be directly applicable to practice. There is, therefore, a tendency to emphasize technology and applied science to the neglect of basic science or theoretical science. The Communist schools are turning out a large army of engineers and technicians who are introducing the machine age into China. They have displayed much ingenuity in applying what is known in modern science to the problems of industrialization and national construction.

Realizing that big power status in the world today is in large part dependent on advance in nuclear science, the Communists have encouraged research in this field. Here they seem to make an exception to their utilitarian emphasis. Scientists engaged in theoretical research in this and related fields enjoy generous support and a high status.

The desired product of Communist education is the new socialist man. He is a pro-

duction man and a man versed in the Communist ideology and dedicated to the proletarian cause under the leadership of the Communist party. The new ideal is summed up in the expression, "Red experts." Education must produce experts, but no technical expert can be of any good unless he is politically sound—in other words, unless he is "Red." Intellectuals are told that they must be "both Red and expert." Among the newly established institutions are the "Red-and-expert" schools and universities.

The New Socialist Man

The "Red-and-expert" concept applies to women as well as men. The beauty queen in Communist China is not a girl in a bathing suit, but one in overalls operating a factory machine or driving a tractor, or she may be leading a parade gustfully shouting slogans demanding the liquidation of counter-revolutionaries at home and imperialists abroad.

The old intellectuals are required to go into the farms and factories, to become peasants and workers, to learn to be "Red." At the same time, peasants and workers indoctrinated in the new ideology are being advanced in the spare-time schools and in the "Red-and-expert colleges and universities" to become the core of the new "proletarian intelligentsia." Thus the Communists are using education to change the pattern of Chinese society.

This program is not altogether successful. Despite the intensive indoctrination program, there are indications that the Communist ideology has not taken root in the Chinese mind and that the "thought reform" has met with much inner resistance. Moreover, the program contains many contradictions and there are times when the Communists do not seem to know in which direction to move. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that revolutionary changes are taking place and educational facilities are being multiplied at an amazing speed.

"We stand for freedom. That is our conviction for ourselves, that is our only commitment to others. No friend, no neutral, and no adversary should think otherwise. We are not against any man, or any nation, or any system, except as it is hostile to freedom. . . ." —U.S. President John F. Kennedy, May 25, 1961.

Discussing government and law in Communist China, this specialist writes that ultimate control is exercised by the Communist party: "No matter what institutions have been designed and what measures adopted, however, the real motivating power behind the whole system of government and law in Communist China lies with the C.C.P." "... The government [is] only the policy executioner."

Government and Law in Communist China

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"NORMALLY a country is governed by law," it has been asserted not atypically sometime ago. "To date," however, "Red China has no legal code." "Enforcement of radical changes began as persuasion but when the gloved hand found itself unable to lead, the mailed fist was shown."¹

Nevertheless, it would be possible for "posterity a hundred years from now" to view the present mainland government as representing "China's golden era." This might result if future generations should "try to judge the present solely by reading laws, declarations and articles" that have been written and accept them "on the surface value of words."² These are the words of a "democratic party" leader who joined the Peking regime early. He served in its high councils for several years, "drafting and amending statutes and laws," and only recently left for Hong Kong. There are others who have found a governmental system in post-1949 China suffi-

ciently legitimized to stand analysis, although its plagiarism from the Soviets and antagonism to Western democracy seem inevitably to warrant more attention than anything else.

Does this mean that a question such as government and law in Communist China can well be dismissed by the simple designation "totalitarianism"—under which people supposedly live in slavery and human intelligence then ceases to function? In fact, can we be led to believe that Communist China does not have a *raison d'être* of its own and is therefore bound to fall of its own weight? For some, this would be indeed a very palatable thought to entertain. But for many others, the existence of Communist China has been anything but simple, much less unreal, and perhaps the least palatable of all among the thorny problems in the world today. Apparently, some more realistic and balanced attitude is necessary if we are trying to establish any rapport with this challenging question.

A prerequisite for any realistic appraisal of the state system in mainland China today is the knowledge that, aside from persuasive dictatorial control by the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) the system is basically dynamic and not equilibrating in design³ or

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¹ Stewart Allen, *China under Communist Control* (Behind the Headlines, XIV, 1), Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, February 1954, p. 14.

² Chow Ching-wen, *Ten Years of Storm: The True Story of the Communist Regime in China*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960, pp. 50f.

³ See "Forword" by Senator Alexander Wiley in U.S. Senate, *Tensions in Communist China*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960, p. v.

purpose. It is, in other words, both an operating and a growing system, and is meant to promote orderly change rather than to reduce the changed order simply to a constitutional form. This dynamics consists of several important kinetic factors.

Dynamics of the System

The first such factor is *history* itself. The concept of the state as borne out by the 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), for instance, did not take shape overnight, but had previously gone through certain vicissitudes in the Chinese Communist movement, and has been subject to further extra-constitutional changes in recent years. The Constitution as a document was "based on" and "a development of" the 1949 Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (C.P.P.C.C.), which embodied Mao Tse-tung's "People's Democratic Dictatorship" (1949), "Coalition Government" (1945) and "New Democracy" (1940). These ideological formulations, in turn, had their roots in practices used in the "liberated areas" and "border regions" in China during the Yen-an period. Further back, the Kiangsi Soviets in 1931 had already framed a Constitution.

In the Kiangsi days, the state in the Chinese Communist vocabulary was a "Soviet Republic" of the "toiling masses of China" aiming at the overthrow of "the rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang (K.M.T.)," establishment of a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," and "systematic elimination" of the "development of capitalism." During the Yen-an period, after defeat and exile from Kiangsi and the experience of alliance with the K.M.T. in the face of Japanese aggression, the "New Democracy" and "Coalition Government" both envisioned a state based on a broad "united front" of "anti-imperialist" and "anti-feudal" bourgeoisie and proletarian classes. This was regarded as necessary during the "bourgeois-democratic stage" of the revolution, leaving other blueprints to be worked out during a follow-up "socialist stage."

⁴ A. N. Agarwala, *The Government and Politics of China*, Allahabad, Kitab Mahal, p. 4. The author, a professor at the University of Allahabad (India), asserts that his book has been "based on personal discussions" while visiting China in 1955 as well as "an impartial study of basic data" ("Preface").

Victory over the K.M.T. through the civil war gave rise to the idea of a new "People's Democratic Dictatorship" based on a "people's democratic united front," now excluding the "bureaucratic capitalists," "feudal elements," K.M.T. "reactionaries" and "running dogs of imperialism" but including, still, the "national" and "petty" bourgeoisie, as embodied in the Common Program of 1949-1954.

According to the 1954 Constitution, however, the P.R.C. "is a people's democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." The "people's democratic united front," theoretically still retained, now vaguely includes "all democratic classes, parties and groups, and people's organizations" and excludes only "traitors and counter-revolutionaries," "feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists." The "national" and "petty" bourgeoisie, however, are no longer specifically mentioned as classes sharing the "people's democratic dictatorship"—although their "parties and groups," together with other "people's organizations," are still represented in the C.P.P.C.C. The C.P.P.C.C. continues to exist as the current form of the "people's democratic united front" charged with the auxiliary role of "mobilizing and uniting" the elements it represents among the population to help carry out state policies and tasks (already determined by the ruling "alliance of workers and peasants led by the working class" and its "vanguard," the C.C.P.).

In a sense, the 1954 Constitution may be regarded as a realization of the dreams of the Kiangsi days. Yet even this newly designed state was not meant to be final. The Constitution, while consolidating earlier "gains of the Chinese people's revolution" and "new political and economic victories" since the founding of the P.R.C., still merely "reflects the basic needs of the state in the transition period" on the road to socialism. Hence, this basic law is reportedly to "serve the people of China for a duration of four five-year plans only," with a new constitution envisioned for 1972.⁴ But as early as 1956, C.C.P. authorities already started in their ideological directives to equate the present "people's democratic dictatorship" directly with "dictatorship of the proletariat," which concept has since been in vogue in mainland

China.⁵ If the 1972 constitution is ever framed, the concept of "alliance" or "united front" would perhaps no longer apply; thus China would be a state with a single "class."

The second factor is *active effort*. Peking's laws, of which the number is great, provide programs of "action," of strivings both in the positive and the negative sense, rather than merely imperative and prohibitive injunctions, or rules of conduct and patterns of order. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1950, for instance, started a land reform movement that aggressively "negated" the landlords and promoted the peasants. The Regulations for the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries of 1951 engendered campaigns of "suppression" that vanquished the "counter-revolutionaries" and glorified the revolutionaries. Even the seemingly non-active Marriage Law of 1950 led to a "movement" of "fulfilment" that caused "tumult in every household." This law was deemed to be based on the traditional "feudal marriage system" it purported to "abolish."⁶ On the whole, that which is provided for the present is meant to "create favorable conditions" for future changes of a higher order in the Communist scheme of things.

The third factor is *internal antagonism*. The state apparatus in Communist China, as in any Communist country during the period of the "class society," is regarded as an "instrument of class struggle." The "ruling class" may use it to suppress "class enemies" and to bring about progress and well-being for its own members and allies. There is thus "contradiction" between "the people," i.e., members of the "united front," and "enemies of the people," i.e., "traitors and counter-revolutionaries," "feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists." There is also "contradiction" among "the people" themselves. The "people's democratic dictatorship," as a result, practices "democracy" towards "the people" but enforces "dictator-

ship" over "enemies of the people." Such differentiation, together with the themes of "struggle" and "progress," naturally tends to engender moves and counter-moves, which in turn produce dynamic readjustments or processes of "negation."

The fourth factor, finally, is "*democratic centralism*," which "all organs of the state" in Communist China must "practice." At the one extreme, the state organs "must rely on the masses of the people, constantly maintain close contact with them, heed their opinions and accept supervision by them." Also, "all persons working in organs of the state must be loyal to the people's democratic system, observe the Constitution and the law and strive to serve the people." At the other extreme, the state is run "under the leadership" of the C.C.P.; so is the whole "people's revolution." The pursuits, interests and opinions of 650 million persons can hardly remain static or uniform, no matter how little these constitutional phrases might mean to them—all the more so because they are often directed, coaxed and re-interpreted by the C.C.P., which itself aims at bringing about changes and has the least reason to remain idle on any "front" of social activities. As basic principles of state operation, therefore, both "democratic centralism" and the "mass line" tend to create dynamic evolution.

Government Apparatus

As matters stand, however, the Peking government is the direct product of the 1954 Constitution. This government is a self-styled dictatorship which, because of its subscription to "democratic centralism," favors the "integration" rather than the "triple separation of powers" known to the West. Western government is regarded as "old democracy"; its parliamentary system is said to be "a device whereby a portion of the ruling group allows the minority, i.e., the opposition, to give empty talks on the platform of the meeting, while the actual rulers firmly hold political power in their hands and engage in such activities as are conducive to their domination." "This," it is alleged, "is a kind of deceitful democratic system for the exploiting class to play legerdemain before the people and divide spoils."⁷

Not playing "legerdemain," the P.R.C. places all legislative, executive and judicial

⁵ For some relevant discussion, see Benjamin Schwartz, "Ideology and the Sino-Soviet Alliance" in Howard L. Boorman et al, *Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957.

⁶ Consult Chow Ching-wen, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-146.

⁷ The words of Tung Pi-wu, a C.C.P. leader and former chairman of the S.C.'s Committee on Political and Legal Affairs, former President of the S.P.C., and currently one of the two Vice Chairmen of the P.R.C., as cited in Teng Ch'u-min, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih wen-i'i chiang-hua* (Lectures on China's Political Problems), Peking, Wen-hua Kung-ying-she, 1949, p. 154.

power with "the people" as represented by the National People's Congress (N.P.C.) and local people's congresses. Thus the state constitutionally "suppresses" and "punishes all traitors and counter-revolutionaries" and "deprives feudal landlords and bureaucratic capitalists of political rights for a specified period" according to law. "The people," according to the Electoral Law of 1953, enjoy "universal suffrage" at the age of 18, "irrespective of nationality, race, sex, occupation, social origin, religious belief, education, property status and length of residence." China's large territory and population enable the people, thus, to elect nearly six million deputies directly to some 225,000 local people's congresses which, through indirect elections at the higher levels with differentiated ratios of representation favoring the worker-dominated urban areas, finally produce the N.P.C. with over 1,200 deputies. The term of office for these deputies is 4 years at the national and provincial levels, and 2 years at the lower levels.

The N.P.C., meeting once a year for several weeks as "the highest organ of state power," enjoys exclusive legislative power but also amends the Constitution, elects and removes the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the P.R.C. and "decides" on the appointment and removal of the Premier and ministerial members of the State Council (S.C.), and elects and removes the President of the Supreme People's Court (S.P.C.) as well as the chief of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (S.P.P.). It further "exercises all other functions and powers" which it "considers necessary." Its power, therefore, is unlimited and unlimitable. When it is not in session, there is a smaller standing committee of some 60 members which functions as a "permanent body," assuming most of the N.P.C.'s powers and conducting all the essential business, including interpretation of the laws and supervision of the judicial and executive organs. This makes the standing committee of the N.P.C. the real constitutional locus of state power, which it exercises procedurally in conjunction with the Chairman of the P.R.C.

The chairman of the P.R.C., formerly

Mao Tse-tung and now Liu Shao-ch'i, is to a large extent only a figurehead and not a chief executive. But "great symbolic importance" is said to have been attached to this office because "its occupant can be cast in the traditional paternal image of the Emperor."⁸ He represents the country externally and promulgates laws and decrees, appoints and dismisses administrative officials from the Premier downwards, proclaims war and orders mobilization—all "in accordance with decisions" made by the N.P.C. or its standing committee. He also commands the armed forces. His term of office is 4 years.

In terms of practical leadership, the chairman of the P.R.C. has at his disposal two advisory agencies: the Supreme State Conference (S.S.C.) and the National Defense Council (N.D.C.). The S.S.C. is composed of the vice chairman of the P.R.C., the chairman of the standing committee of the N.P.C., the premier, "and others concerned"—meaning usually ranking personnel of all major agencies of the central government who often number over 300 in actual attendance. The N.D.C. is somewhat an honorific body of military advisers, numbering over 100 and composed almost one-third of former K.M.T. generals. As the ex officio presiding officer, the chairman of the P.R.C. may transmit results of deliberation by these two bodies on "important state matters" to the N.P.C., its standing committee, the State Council, or other organs concerned "for discussion and decision."

The State Council, under the direct supervision not of the chairman of the P.R.C. but of the standing committee of the N.P.C., is "the highest administrative organ." Headed by a premier (Chou En-lai since 1949) and 16 vice premiers who are concurrently heads of important ministries, it is composed of 30 major ministries and more than a dozen commissions and bureaus. Through monthly plenary meetings and more frequent, weekly consultations between the Premier and his immediate assistants, i.e., vice premiers, secretary general, and so forth, the State Council exercises administrative and other powers and functions vested in it by the N.P.C. and its standing committee. It is responsible to the latter. It has its own Organic Law and is in the practical sense the real government, making necessary decisions and supervising

⁸ U.S. Senate, *National Policy Machinery in Communist China*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959, p. 16.

the formulation of national plans to implement policies already made.

The Premier normally presides over plenary State Council meetings and initiates the "inner-Cabinet" type of consultations; his actual stature in the controlling C.C.P. often adds policy-making significance to his own personal acts and thoughts.⁹ Under him there are six "staff offices" each in charge of a number of related ministries and/or commissions and bureaus, ranging from 2 to 15, for administrative coordination purposes. The Staff Office for Political and Legal Affairs, for example, has jurisdiction over the Ministries of the Interior and Public Security, the latter being the administrative arm of law-enforcement.

For administrative purposes the whole China mainland, under the Ministry of the Interior, is divided into three major levels of local units: 1) provinces, autonomous (i.e., minority) regions, and municipalities directly subordinate to the central authority; 2) autonomous *chou* (prefectures), counties, autonomous counties, and municipalities; and 3) *hsiang* (rural districts), nationality (i.e., minority) *hsiang*, and towns. Local people's congresses are elected directly at the *hsiang* and town level, and indirectly at the higher levels. These congresses in turn elect the local people's councils as organs of local administration, and may also recall the individual members thereof, all at their corresponding levels. Redemarcation of these local administrative units has taken place quite often, especially at the lower levels but including even the provincial level.

With the advent of the commune system in 1958, administrative division at the basic level became a matter of free gerrymandering, with *hsiang* and towns merged into single units. But the congress-council (in this case, "management committee") set-up still applies.¹⁰

Law-Enforcing Agencies

Besides the Constitution, there are in mainland China today as many "laws" and "regulations" as administrative concerns, and as many other "constitutions" as political, economic, social and cultural organizations. Each important state organ, such as the N.P.C., S.C., S.P.C., S.P.P., and so on, has its own Organic Law. Each major policy,

such as labor insurance, cooperativization, people's commune movement, is carried out with written "regulations" or guide rules. Each sizable institution, such as the C.P.P.C.C., trade union, youth corps, also has its own constitution. Other codes of both a procedural and substantive nature, such as the Military Service Law and Regulations on the Conferment of Orders and Medals, also abound. Citizens' rights and "freedoms" under the Constitution include most of those provided in the basic laws of Western democracies, plus the right to work, rest, material assistance in old age, illness or disability insurance, education, cultural activities, equality of sex, criticize the government, and overseas protection. Their significance, while undoubtedly nominal in Western eyes, must be appraised against China's traditional and modern background.

Citizens also have certain "duties," e.g., to "abide by the Constitution and the law, preserve labor discipline and public order and respect social ethics," to "respect and safeguard public property," to "pay taxes" and "perform military service according to law." A penal code is known to have been drafted, but a civil code is still being worked out. With the social structure, concepts of property ownership, "production relationships," and so forth, all subject to frequent changes, the forming of even a temporary civil code would apparently face great difficulties.

One of the major "independent" agencies designed to enforce these laws, rights and duties is the S.P.C., which together with local and special courts exercises "judicial authority." The other agency is the S.P.P., which has local and special offices and exercise "supervisory power" over all central and local organs of the state and the personnel thereof, as well as the citizenry at large, in order "to ensure observance of the law."

The court hierarchy, according to its Organic Law, consists of a 2-trial, 4-level system. Under the S.P.C. are the provincial

⁹ See George S. Gale, *No Flies in China*, New York, Morrow 1955, pp. 129ff. for a first-hand observation of Chou's personal influence and position.

¹⁰ Although trial communes were first set up both in the cities and in the countryside in 1958, the latter has been found easier to reorganize on a nation-wide basis—difficulties at modifications notwithstanding, whereas the drive in the cities has been under way only recently. Consult *People's Communes in China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1958; and J. Chung-yi, "Long Live Urban People's Communes," *America's Consul-General, Hong Kong, Current Background* (CE No. 625 (1960), pp. 17-25.

(high), sub-provincial (intermediate), and county (primary) courts, each with a president, one or more vice presidents and a number of judges. The courts are divided into criminal, civil, and other relevant chambers, which in turn have their own chiefs and deputy chiefs. The court president at each level is elected and removable by, and therefore accountable to, the corresponding people's congress. Other court members and officials are appointed and removable, apparently upon recommendation of the presidents, by people's councils at the corresponding levels. The higher courts, including the S.P.C., may have original as well as appellate jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the cases referred to them through appeal or by law. But only one appellate trial in addition to the original one may be had.

Special courts, e.g., military courts, railway transportation courts, and so on, may be created directly under the S.C., but the S.P.C. remains the highest and sole supervisory organ over the whole judicial system, including both special and ordinary courts. Procurators at the corresponding levels may protest the courts' decisions and bring about re-trials according to law. A system of "people's assessors," or jury-like popularly selected participants at the trials, plays a supervisory as well as an auxiliary role. It is only to a very limited extent, therefore, that the courts "are independent in the exercise of their judicial authority."

The procuratorial hierarchy likewise has its own Organic Law, and its ordinary and special agencies parallel those of the court hierarchy. The procurators, charged with investigation and prosecution functions, extend their law-enforcing powers not only to the judicial system but to all government organs and personnel, as well as to the general public. At each level there is a chief procurator, assisted by a deputy and a number of other procurators. The Procurator-General at the national level is appointed and removable by, hence responsible to, the N.P.C. All his subordinates are appointed and removable, upon his recommendation, by the Standing Committee of the N.P.C. and are "not subject to interference by local organs of the state." The procuratorial hierarchy, therefore, enjoys a greater de-

gree of "independence" at all levels and only the head is subject to direct supervision by the Standing Committee of the N.P.C., which also oversees the work of the S.P.C.

In addition, the Ministry of Public Security under the S.C., as the administrative arm of law-enforcement, also has a "hierarchy" of its own. Under the Minister there are public security departments, divisions, bureaus, branch bureaus, and stations at all local levels from province down to the village and city street. There are also special public security committees and groups within factories, schools, offices, railway stations, and so forth. These units are further assisted by local militia and other auxiliary personnel, such as "investigators." Having as their task the defense of the "fruits of the people's revolution" and safeguarding of "the progress China is making in socialist construction," these units are concerned with external as well as domestic security, and thus with intelligence as well as police work. It is this system, plus the courts and procuratorial offices which likewise serve the political interests of the Peking regime, that place the whole China mainland under a ubiquitous and seemingly "water-tight" network of control.

From Peking's point of view, the courts, procuratorates and public security units are all "weapons" of the "people's democratic dictatorship" by which "democracy" and "dictatorship" are respectively divided between "the people" and "enemies of the people." Harshness to the latter is therefore as normal and "juridical" as leniency is to the former. But emphasis has been placed on "combining severity with leniency, reformatory labor with ideological education." General amnesty has been granted (1959); criminals are encouraged to "forsake evil and follow the good" by "giving themselves up" and submitting to reform voluntarily. In practical work, the personnel of these agencies are told to "participate in productive labor" at the same time. Public security units, in particular, have instituted such measures as "love-the-people month" to soft-pedal their activities. The procuratorates, constitutionally, have a supervisory function over both the courts and the public security units. These three agencies, therefore, sometimes experience "dissension" and

"mutual restraint" as well as cooperation and coordination.¹¹

Ultimate Control by the Party

No matter what institutions have been designed and what measures adopted, however, the real motivating power behind the whole system of government and law in Communist China lies with the C.C.P. Members of the Party make up only slightly over 2 per cent of the country's population, yet Party organization, from committee to "fraction," extends into every aspect and level of the state apparatus and its activities. Described by many as "a state within a state" or even "a state above a state," the C.C.P.'s role in relation to the mainland Chinese body politic may best be understood in terms of the nervous system in the human body. Like sensory neurons which receive impulses from without and motor neurons which cause response, from within, the Party members and cadres strategically assigned to state organs and social groups serve to put through established Party policies among, and with the assistance of, the "masses of the people" and "reflect" the latter's "situation" back to the Party Central, which in turn conditions further policies and actions accordingly. Justification of the principle of "democratic centralism," in terms of operational efficiency and ability to survive, lies, then, with this organismic process which, whether consciously intended or otherwise, seems to constitute the very *raison d'être* of the Communist system.

The center of this nervous system, or the brain, is of course the Party's Central Committee (C.C.) or, more precisely, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (P.B.) within it. This 7-man Standing Committee, headed by Mao Tse-tung himself as Chairman of the whole Party, is in command of the P.B. (of over two dozen members); the C.C. (of over 190); a large Secretariat; a number of central departments, committees and bureaus; a vast network of regional and local branches and

groups; and about 14 million or more members. This Party hierarchy, with its parallel units, is in turn in control of the government machinery. In fact important personnel of the Party and government are placed in a purposely overlapping and interlocking manner.

The Chairman of the all-important Standing Committee of the N.P.C. (Chu Teh), for instance, is concurrently a member of the equally all-important Standing Committee of the P.B. and Vice Chairman of the C.C. of the C.C.P. The Chairman of the P.R.C. and ex officio Chairman of the S.S.C. and N.D.C. (Liu Shao-ch'i) is likewise a member of the Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the P.B., also Vice Chairman of the C.C. of the C.C.P. The Premier (Chou En-lai), too, is a member of the Standing Committee of the P.B. and a Vice Chairman of the C.C. of the C.C.P. The 16 Vice Premiers also belong to the P.B. and/or the C.C. The President of the S.P.C. (Hsieh Chueh-tsai) and the chief of the S.P.P. (Chang Ting-ch'eng) are also C.C. members. Mao Tse-tung is the only Party leader who does not now hold any concurrent government office, but his policy-making role is such that this constitutes a blessing rather than a lack.¹² All those just mentioned are his longtime associates.

Organizationally, the Party Central's United Front Department controls the C.P.P.C.C.; its Social Affairs Department controls the Ministry of Public Security; its General Political and Liaison Departments perhaps have to do with government agencies both at home and abroad. Domestically, important administrative measures are always announced jointly by the Party's C.C. and the government's S.C. Most important of all, the Party's "leadership" is constitutionally recognized, and therefore "juridical" rather than "clandestine" in all aspects.¹³ To all intents and purposes, the Party is the real exclusive policy-maker, and the government only the policy executioner.

Communist China "is the largest" and "potentially the most powerful" country in the world, it has been recently observed.¹⁴ Compared to earlier condemnation and depreciation, some say that this might represent a "pendulum" that "has swung too far

¹¹ See Chang Ting-ch'eng (Procurator-General), "Firmly Adhere to the Correct Line of People's Democratic Dictatorship: The People's Procuratorial Work in Ten Years," in American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines*, No. 193 (1959), pp. 17ff.

¹² Consult "The Future of Mao," *The Economist*, December 20, 1958, p. 1067.

¹³ See supra, note 8, p. 4.

¹⁴ "Editorial Note" attached to Edgar Snow's "Report from Red China" in *Look*, January 31, 1961, p. 85.

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Current Documents

U.S. VICE PRESIDENT JOHNSON VISITS SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

On May 10, 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson began a two-week, good-will tour of South and Southeast Asia. He visited six countries: South Vietnam, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, India and Pakistan. Reprinted below are the complete texts of the communiques that were issued following his visits.

Joint Communique, Saigon, May 13, 1961¹

Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President of the United States, has just completed a visit to the Republic of Viet-Nam, on behalf of President Kennedy and on invitation of President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet-Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States.

It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet-Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of free Viet-Nam to choose their own way of life.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its

responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The United States recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently reelected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet-Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances—the need of free Viet-Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the United States to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties—it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerrilla warfare now existing in free Viet-Nam, it is necessary to give high priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of free Viet-Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. These may be

¹ On June 16, the U.S. confirmed that it had agreed, following negotiations with South Vietnamese Cabinet Minister Nguyen Dinh Thuan, to step up U.S. military aid to Vietnam. The U.S. will increase the responsibility of its military advisory group and training specialists and supply arms for 20,000 men to be added to the 150,000-man army. In addition the U.S. has an earlier agreement to supply \$40 million in military aid there.

followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam should be increased, and that the United States would extend its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force.

Fourth, it was agreed that the two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of free Viet-Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against Communist attacks in Viet-Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet-Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet-Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet-Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, education, fisheries, high-

ways, public administration, and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

Joint Communiqué, Manila, May 14, 1961

President Carlos P. Garcia of the Republic of the Philippines and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America met at Malacanang Palace at 7:35 A.M. today and informally discussed matters of interest to their two countries and the free world.

The meeting was cordial and friendly. The discussion was thorough, frank and specific. There was complete agreement on the seriousness of the situation in Southeast Asia. There was also complete agreement on the determination of the two nations to maintain effective strength against Communist encroachments in Asia. On this principle there is complete accord between the two nations.

Vice President Johnson stressed that he came at the request of President Kennedy to seek counsel and judgment and the views of President Garcia on the world situation.

Vice President Johnson presented to President Garcia a letter from President Kennedy.

The Vice President said he gained a greater understanding of the conditions in this part of the world and that when he returned he would present the viewpoints of President Garcia to President Kennedy. The Vice President told President Garcia that he had been deeply thrilled and moved by the enthusiastic welcome of the Philippine people.

He also expressed his admiration over the success of the Philippine reconstruction which he regarded as a tribute to the character and capacity of the Filipino people.

President Garcia congratulated Vice President Johnson for a very timely and heartwarming address before the joint session of

Congress. The two leaders talked about problems which confront the Governments of their two peoples. Among other things, they discussed sugar legislation in the United States; the additional war damage claims bill now pending in the United States Congress; the steps which could be taken together to develop vigorous science programs for the Philippines and United States; the possible Peace Corps projects which will be discussed later in the week with Mr. [Sargent] Shriver [Director of the Peace Corps]; possible legislation re-enacting the pre-war coconut oil tax refund; and legislation pending in the Philippine Congress on easing tobacco import restrictions. President Garcia is going to present to Vice President Johnson a memorandum on the possibilities of a more vigorous development program for Mindanao.

Vice President Johnson assured President Garcia of the United States desire to approach all these matters in a spirit of constructive understanding and that he will report fully through appropriate channels upon his return to Washington.

Joint Communique, Taipei, May 15, 1961

The President of the Republic of China [Chiang Kai-shek] and the Vice President of the United States of America met Sunday at the President's residence and held extended discussions regarding the threat of Communist aggression against the free nations of Asia. The discussions were held in an atmosphere of friendly accord.

The President expressed his pleasure at the visit of the Vice President and the latter noted with deep gratitude the warmth of the welcome he received.

The Vice President wished to note particularly the opportunity he was afforded to greet, meet, and shake hands in friendship with so many Chinese people on the streets of Taipei and Taoyuan.

In the discussions, there was complete agreement on the common purpose of the Republic of China and the United States of America to maintain the integrity of free Asia.

There was candid exploration and consideration of the strategies required to assure effective action.

Both the President and the Vice President

affirmed, as a matter of principle, that all people who desire freedom and are working for freedom should have freedom. Freedom, they agreed, is not for ourselves alone but must be preserved and extended to all who desire it.

The Vice President, on behalf of President Kennedy, assured President Chiang that:

The United States means to stand with her allies in the Asian area;

The United States has no intention of recognizing the Peiping regime;

The United States opposes seating the Peiping regime at the United Nations and regards it as important that the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations should be maintained;

The United States will continue to work with the Republic of China in support of its accelerated growth program.

Discussions encompassed a far-ranging consideration of the international situation in Asia, with reference to the serious situation in Southeast Asia and particularly with regard to the Vice President's visit to Viet-Nam.

The joint communique issued at Saigon by President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Johnson was noted with satisfaction.

The President and Vice President agreed that new measures of cooperation among the free nations of Asia, as well as with the United States and other countries, are necessary and desirable.

The President and the Vice President joined in expressing their common concern with the conditions of famine on the mainland of China and the mass suffering under Communist rule.

In the course of discussions, the President and Vice President agreed that the political, social, agricultural and economic progress in Taiwan, which is the result of the combination of conditions of peace on the island, Chinese skills and industry and American aid, is an achievement worthy of note throughout all Asia and the world.

In conclusion, the President of the Republic of China and the Vice President of the United States expressed the high mutual regard and mutual respect in which the peoples of their two countries hold each other.

Joint Communique, Bangkok, May 18, 1961

The Vice President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Thailand [Sarit Thanarat] have completed a series of meetings during the Vice President's visit to Thailand over the past two days. Their discussions covered many subjects of common interest, and reflected mutual objectives and undertakings of both Governments.

The Vice President stressed that the President of the United States had sent him on this mission to inform the Prime Minister personally and directly of the United States Government's complete understanding of Thailand's concern over the threats to peace and security in Southeast Asia, and conveyed the President's intense interest in the preservation of the independence and political integrity of Thailand and the other free countries of Southeast Asia.

Vice President Johnson also stressed that he had come at the personal request of President Kennedy to obtain the counsel of Prime Minister Sarit on what should be done in the immediate future to meet our common problems. Further, he stressed that he would report the views of the Prime Minister to President Kennedy.

The Vice President expressed his great appreciation for the amount of time, as well as the serious attention, which the Prime Minister and his colleagues devoted to these discussions. He also expressed gratitude for the warmth of the reception of the people of Thailand.

The Vice President noted that Thailand has made great social and economic progress. He cited the advances of Thailand in the fields of education, health, finance and economic development.

The Vice President expressed his interest in the challenge of the development of northeast Thailand where opportunities for development are being sought under the leadership of the Prime Minister.

At the conclusion of their talks, the Prime Minister and the Vice President agreed to the release of a joint communique covering the following points:

(1) Both Governments found mutual understanding regarding the serious situation existing in parts of Southeast Asia. They reached full accord on Thai-United

States objectives of peace and independence, and agreed that both Governments should work for these objectives.

(2) Both Governments recognize that the foundation of freedom rests on the adequate education of the young, the health of the people and the improvement in the standards of livelihood of the people. Both Governments pledged their diligent efforts to the advance of education, health, communications, and other fields of modern progress in Thailand.

(3) The United States Government expressed its determination to honor its treaty commitments to support Thailand—its ally and historic friend—in defense against subversion and Communist aggression.

(4) Both Governments recognize the utmost importance of preserving the integrity and independence of Thailand.

(5) Both Governments reiterated their determination to fulfill their SEATO commitments and to go forward in steadfast partnership.

(6) Both Governments examined possible ways to strengthen Thai defense capabilities, agreed to explore ways in which this might be achieved through greater joint efforts and mutual sacrifices and the military assistance program involving the armed forces.

(7) Both Governments expressed approval of specific joint economic projects such as irrigation projects in the northeast and the new thermal power plant, which are being developed in Thailand, as well as the planning, the setting up of projects under the Peace Corps program.

The Vice President and the Prime Minister re-dedicated themselves to work for an honorable peace in Southeast Asia, and to intensify the efforts of their countries for the defense and progress of the free nations of this region.

Finally, they agreed on the desirability of regular consultation with as much frequency as may be practicable.

Joint Communique, New Delhi, May 19, 1961

The Vice-President and the Prime Minister [Jawaharlal Nehru] have had full and highly useful discussions covering a wide range of subjects of interest and concern to the two countries. At the outset, Vice-Pres-

ident Johnson conveyed to Prime Minister Nehru the warm greetings of President Kennedy and told him of the President's admiration for the way in which India is waging its great battle against privation and poverty. He told of the President's interest in the Third Five Year Plan.

1. The Vice-President said that while American assistance is dependent on the decisions of the Congress and also on parallel efforts by the other developed countries, it is the President's hope that American aid to the new Plan will be both substantial in amount and effective in form. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction at the President's interest in India's development plans.

2. The two leaders agreed that the common enemies of mankind, on which a major attack must now be mounted, are ignorance, poverty and disease. The conquest of these everywhere is the first step to the assurance of peace and freedom.

3. The new American Administration agrees with the Prime Minister that the benefits of economic advance must accrue to those who need help the most. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of effective land reform in many underdeveloped countries as a vital step toward greater social and economic equality. The Vice-President agreed on the importance of such reform and noted that the United States was a strong believer in home ownership and in the distribution of the ownership of land, particularly by those who work it.

4. The Prime Minister mentioned to the Vice-President the Indian program for establishing universal free and compulsory education in the Third Five Year Plan. Both leaders agreed on the fundamental importance of education in economic development.

5. The Vice-President told of President Kennedy's concern for assuring an effective cessation of hostilities in Laos and for getting a truly neutral and independent government which would be neither dominated nor threatened from any quarter. He expressed satisfaction and thanks for India's past assistance in obtaining a cease-fire. The Prime Minister expressed his full approval of the goal of a neutral and independent Laos and

assured his continuing assistance and support in achieving this end.

6. The Vice-President, who has long been associated closely with developments in exploration and research in space in the United States, stressed American concern for peaceful and concerted effort by all nations in the great adventure into outer space. He told of the imminent prospects for the development of a communications satellite with its promise of a possible breakthrough in the field of mass education. He outlined also the prospects for, and potential value of, the weather satellite. These developments will be of benefit not alone to Americans but to all mankind. They will belong to all mankind. The expense of development has so far been a barrier to participation by the scientists and engineers of the less developed countries. The United States would like now to find ways to broaden interest and participation in these epoch-making activities. The Prime Minister expressed much interest on behalf of India and promised the matter his close attention.

7. There was discussion of the Peace Corps. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of voluntary workers being men and women of good training who are also otherwise well prepared for their new life and tasks. He expressed satisfaction with his talks with the Director of the Peace Corps.

8. Early in their conversations the Prime Minister and the Vice-President found a strong common interest in the field of electric power development. The Vice-President was one of the pioneers in rural electrification in the United States, having, at President Roosevelt's request, participated in the establishment of the largest rural electrification project in the United States. The Prime Minister told of his longstanding conviction that electric light, and all that went with it, were the greatest gift of modern industrial society. Because of the high capital costs and the heavy demands for foreign exchange that are involved, the development of power generating capacity has been an especially important area of American aid. The Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the accomplishments which could be attributed to this aid in the Second Five Year Plan and the two leaders reviewed the large de-

mands for power to be met in the Third Five Year Plan. The Vice-President expressed his hope that during the Third Five Year Plan there would be particular success in getting electricity to rural villages.

In concluding their talks, the Vice-President and the Prime Minister returned again to hunger, illiteracy and disease which are basic problems of the peoples of the under-developed countries. The battle against them will not easily be won; but neither can it be longer delayed. The Vice-President stated that India's experience in dealing with these basic problems is of great value to the United States which wishes to use its resources for aiding the peoples of the under-developed countries. The Vice-President and the Prime Minister expressed a desire for close and continuing consultation on these problems. The Prime Minister expressed his warm appreciation of Vice-President Johnson's mission and the opportunity the visit gave for frank and friendly exchange of views and ideas.

Joint Communique, Karachi, May 20, 1961

The President of Pakistan [Mohammed Ayub Khan] and the Vice President of the United States of America met Saturday, May 20, 1961, at the President's House for talks, which were conducted in a frank and friendly atmosphere reflecting the continuing close cooperation of Pakistan and the United States in pursuit of common objectives.

The Vice President expressed the friendly greetings and warm good wishes of President Kennedy and the American people for the President and the people of Pakistan. The Vice President noted that the United States anticipated with pleasure President Ayub's visit in November. In this connection, Vice President Johnson extended a personal invitation for President Ayub to visit the Vice President's ranch home in Texas during the stay in the United States. President Ayub recalled that he had previously visited Texas which reminded him of Pakistan and expressed pleasure in accepting the Vice President's invitation.

Vice President Johnson explained that he had come at the request of President Kennedy and presented to President Ayub a personal letter from the President of the

United States. The Vice President said that President Kennedy wanted him to discuss with the leaders of Pakistan and other countries of South and Southeast Asia what might be done further to strengthen peace and freedom and to enhance the general welfare of the people. Vice President Johnson said the exchange in Karachi would be of great value toward a closer understanding of Pakistan and the views of Pakistan's leaders toward regional and world problems.

In the course of the conversations, President Ayub and Vice President Johnson noted with satisfaction the many common objectives and specific programs of cooperation that link the two countries. They welcomed continued cooperation in regional collective security arrangements, such as Cento and Seato, and the growing economic and social cooperation among the regional members of these alliances. They discussed measures to strengthen these alliances.

President Ayub and Vice President Johnson agreed that the long term security of the free world must be built on a foundation of progress assuring greater opportunity and a better life for the people.

Specifically:

1. President Ayub reviewed the objectives of Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan and progress in its implementation. The Vice President reaffirmed the United States' firm interest in supporting Pakistan's implementation of this far-sighted program.

2. The two leaders discussed the great problems arising from the loss of agricultural lands in Pakistan due to water-logging and salinization. The President outlined the energetic program planned to cope with this problem, and the Vice President received documentation for use in considering further means by which the United States might assist.

3. The importance of education was emphasized. President Ayub described the substantial educational programs of his country to which both government and private assistance is being extended from the United States. Means of further cooperation in this field were considered.

4. It was recognized that the provision of adequate housing is an essential primary need of any community or nation. In this context, assistance being extended by the United

States to supplement Pakistan's housing programs was reviewed.

5. The provision of greater health facilities was discussed at length.

6. Plans for the assignment to Pakistan of members of the American Peace Corps were discussed, and President Ayub expressed particular interest in the assignment of Peace Corps members to work on projects in such fields as health, education and agriculture.

7. President Ayub discussed Pakistan's land reform programs in which millions of acres have been re-distributed, giving new ownership to hundreds of thousands of people who work the lands.

8. Vice President Johnson said that the United States has high expectations that international cooperation in scientific developments will be of great benefit to countries on every continent. He mentioned in particular possibilities from weather, communication, navigational and mapping uses of space vehicles.

9. The President and Vice President discussed the possible advantages of a meeting to be held in the near future of heads of nations of Asia and the Pacific area to review their common aspirations, objectives and problems and to seek means of greater cooperation among themselves.

(Continued from p. 170)

the other way," and that a "time of greatest crisis" might well lie ahead of the Peking regime.¹⁵ Others have noticed, again, that Peking has been able to achieve "power out of crisis," and that, "by an effective exploitation of nationalism," it "has grown into a powerful going concern for national rejuvenation."¹⁶ Still others have candidly pointed out that the C.C.P., because of its fanatic "faith in orthodox Marxism-Leninism," shows "blindness to the possibility that a Communist Party may abuse its power" and that "failure to recognize the challenging parliamentary institutions" of the West is, in fact, "infantile" and may well result in "political sterility of people who regard

themselves as revolutionary" despite the accompanying "emotional dynamic" which has been quite useful in promoting the revolution itself.¹⁷

The Chinese Communists' answer is that they are aware of all possible shortcomings, including abusiveness in the exercise of exclusive power, and that they have devised ways and means to correct them and are honestly striving to build China "within not too long a period and at a comparatively high speed, into a country with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture"—in accordance with the "lofty aspiration and great resolve of the Chinese people."¹⁸

Dr. Sun Yat-sen used to compare the politically apathetic Chinese people with "a pile of sand." For better or for worse, the opposite is undoubtedly true today. It is probably easier to criticize than to run a country of 650 million effectively. It is hard to suit everyone's political taste and value standards at once. Whatever "lies ahead" of the Peking regime apparently awaits the judgment of history.

¹⁵ G. H. Hudson, "Stability of Mao's Regime," *Current History*, December 1960, pp. 327ff.

¹⁶ Werner Levi, "China and the Two Great Powers," *Current History*, December, 1960, pp. 232ff; Kuo Ping-chia, *China: New Age and New Outlook*, New York, Knopf, 1956, p. 90.

¹⁷ Michael Lindsay, *China and the Cold War*, Victoria (Australia), Melbourne University Press, 1955, pp. 76ff; A. Bevan, as quoted in George S. Gale, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹⁸ Chou En-lai, *Report on the Work of the Government*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954, especially pp. 35ff, and "Speech at National Day Celebration" (October 1, 1960), in CB, No. 638 (1960), pp. 4ff.

"... We are in a world of rapid change, in which men and nations must learn to control themselves in their relations with others.

"To my mind, this can only be done through institutions.

"Human nature does not change, but when people accept the same rules and the same institutions to make sure that they are applied, their behavior towards each other changes. This is the process of civilization itself."—*Jean Monnet, President of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, in an address delivered at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, June 11, 1961.*

Received At Our Desk

. . . On China and the Far East

DRAGON IN THE KREMLIN: A Report on the Russian-Chinese Alliance. By MARVIN L. KALB. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1961. 258 pages and index, \$4.50.)

Marvin Kalb, currently reporting from Moscow for C.B.S., has written a stimulating, informative account of the Sino-Soviet alliance, its strains and strengths. The study is a testament to Kalb's energy, interest, and ingenuity. Eschewing the limited comforts of Moscow, the author embarked on a journey which took him to many of the key capitals of the world, in his search for information and insights. His report is top-notch journalism; it is an illuminating, often perceptive, commentary on one of the world's great questions: the nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Kalb believes that Moscow is far more concerned over Peking's belligerent posture and expansionist appetites than is usually understood or appreciated in the West, particularly in the United States. While he does not foresee any imminent split between the colossi of international communism, he does anticipate a period of intensified disagreement. The author holds that Khrushchev is worried lest "Mao's truculence may accidentally or deliberately touch off an atomic war—one that could destroy Russia's abundance and Communism's hope. This fear has forced Khrushchev into the uncomfortable position where he feels he must overlook China's psychological and ideological haughtiness and try to maintain closer relations with Peking. A warmer alliance might then help Khrushchev to exercise a moderating influence over Chinese behavior."

In keeping with the views of a growing number of specialists, Kalb calls for "a

highly flexible foreign policy aimed at exploiting the divisive pressures in the alliance so that Moscow and Peking will be deprived of the opportunity of facing the United States as a united team." To do this, he proposes some strong measures: recognition of Communist China; Red China's admission to the United Nations; recognition of the government of Outer Mongolia; establishment of a program of cultural and educational exchanges with Communist China; and a "massive education program throughout the United States—with federal funds, if necessary—to prepare the American people for the bitter, desperate struggle that we surely face with China—whether China remains allied to Russia or not."

These proposals are not designed to win Kalb any popularity; but they are the serious, sober judgments of a first class correspondent. A.Z.R.

SUN YAT-SEN AND COMMUNISM. BY SHAO CHUAN LENG AND NORMAN D. PALMER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. 234 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

Sun Yat-sen was the father of modern Chinese nationalism. Though he died in 1925, his ideas have been considered important enough by the Chinese Communists to incorporate, where possible, into Marxism-Leninism. Professors Shao Chuan Leng and Norman D. Palmer have written an informative, penetrating analysis of the relationship between Dr. Sun's ideology and Communist ideology. Sun was not a Communist, but he was greatly influenced by the Bolshevik revolution, by Bolshevik ideology, and by the Leninist concept of the Party. The ties between Sun and the early Bolshevik leaders were particularly close during the 1922-1925

period. For it was in China that Lenin applied for the first time his concept of a National Front, of cooperation between the Communist party and a bourgeois nationalist party (Kuomintang) against a common enemy: the West.

The authors carefully and clearly develop Dr. Sun's key concepts: the Three People's Principals, i.e., nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. They then proceed to show how the Chinese Communists have reinterpreted Dr. Sun's principles to accord with their needs and objectives. On the other hand, the Communists criticize Sun "for the tendency to compromise, the concepts of 'Greater' Asia and 'Pan-Hanism,' the suggestion to revive ancient morality, the lack of complete confidence in the people, the insistence upon political tutelage, the denial of class war, and the reformists' type of economic program."

In their concluding remarks, the authors soberly, and somewhat sadly, note that the West missed a golden opportunity in China. This failure occurred not in 1949, when the Communists gained control over the mainland, but three decades earlier when the Western governments, and the United States in particular, "took a dim view of Dr. Sun and his movement; they gave it little chance to succeed; they still officially recognized the regime in Peking, against which the Kuomintang was in revolt from the time of the split between Dr. Sun and Yuan Shih-k'ai."

A.Z.R.

THE ANTHILL: The Human Condition In Communist China. By SUZANNE LABIN. Translated from the French by Edward Fitzgerald. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1960. 442 pages, \$6.75.)

Perhaps of all the world's displaced persons the Chinese refugees in Hongkong are the most forgotten and overlooked by the free world's press. Madame Labin, a distinguished French political commentator, is much concerned with the immediate past of those million and a half Chinese who have escaped from the mainland since the formation of the Chinese Peoples Republic. Western, specifically

American, knowledge of conditions in Communist China has largely been confined to interpretative newspaper accounts, analyses by expatriates and individual experts and the survey of the mainland press published by the American Consulate in Hongkong. The author has done us a service by introducing a new dimension to our understanding of contemporary China by securing her information from the forgotten and often nondescript typical human beings that are the mainstay of any society. She has interviewed some 54 Chinese refugees, among them bureaucrats, peasants, former party officials and scholars, and has elicited from them a composite picture of a strait-laced, almost unchinese, dictatorship dedicated towards the perpetuation of its own élites.

By using a deceptively simple question and answer technique with her respondents Madame Labin deftly develops for her readers the main issues and quandaries that have led the individual to cut his ties with the mainland. The best of the chapters of *The Anthill* (The Former Communist Ku: pages 19-43; The Peoples Communes: pages 75-120) deal with this personal as well as psychological aspects of "brainwashing" implicit in the official conforming process. These few pages give an intriguing preliminary impression of this phase of Chinese Communist engineering.

It is regrettable to say that in the final chapters (Are The Chinese People Really Working For Themselves? and Yellow Peril Or Red?) the author becomes exhortatory and completes her account on a note of almost anti-Communist hysteria. It is the weakness of the volume that *The Anthill* combines a unique and often authoritative account of the political behavior and aspirations of the "average" Chinese with an emotional polemic on the causes and consequences of "freedom." This is a puzzling, yet worthwhile book.

RENE PERITZ
University of Pennsylvania

JAPAN SUBDUED. The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific. By HERBERT FEIS. (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1961. 199 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.00.)

With *Japan Subdued*, Herbert Feis brings to an end his distinguished chronicle of the wartime alliance against the Axis powers. He treats the complex, momentous events of the May through September, 1945, period with his customary lucidity, perceptiveness and meticulous scholarship.

In May, 1945, Japan stood alone. "The structure of Japanese life and production was being smashed and burned. The Japanese Navy and Air Force were but remnants of what they had been. But the spirit of defiance was still alive in the armed services and among the people—unwavering in their acceptance of suffering and the sad stroke of death." Despite Allied warnings, the Japanese refused to surrender.

On August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; on August 9, Soviet troops swept into Manchuria and Korea. Japan's fate was sealed.

Feis carefully reconstructs the factors that influenced the Great Power decisions of this period: the military assumption that the Japanese would fight to the bitter end; the political forces pressing for adherence to the doctrine of "unconditional surrender"; and the developments at Potsdam. Feis speculates that it might have

been wise to have told Stalin "candidly and adequately of the nature of the new weapon, of what had been learned about it in the New Mexico test, and of the intention to use it against the Japanese early in August. Further queries could then have been met with a statement of our willingness to share knowledge about production of the weapon, and even to enter into partnership, as soon as a satisfactory agreement was reached on joint control of its production and use." Perhaps the sequence of subsequent events, and the Soviet reaction to them, might have been different, and with it the trend of postwar political developments.

American policy during this period rested on three assumptions: "one was that since Stalin was deemed to have restricted Soviet aims in the Far East reasonably in the statements he made to Hopkins, there was no sound reason for trying to avert Soviet entry into the war. Another was that the China upon which we were bestowing many benefits would be a faithful friend and ally in the Far East. The third was that there was no good reason to refrain from the use of the atomic bomb, like any other weapon, against Japan."

Rich in analytical insights and cultured speculation, this book offers many rewards to the careful reader and student.

A.Z.R.

(Continued from p. 150)

simply that the Soviets display a greater caution about the use of violence in achieving their objective than the Chinese do.

Finally, although the military forces of Red China are in a state of transition, they still pose a formidable problem for any nation in a conventional war. It is of first rank importance for the United States and the entire free world that China should not

acquire a nuclear capability, but it appears beyond our powers to prevent this, except through an enforceable disarmament agreement to which Red China is a party. So far there is little indication that such an agreement will actually be achieved. Thus, the West must start thinking and planning its course of action in the event that the Chinese Communists actually acquire a nuclear capability.

ERRATUM

The Editors regret that an error appeared on page 306, right hand column, of the May, 1961, issue of CURRENT HISTORY, in the book review of *Khrushchev: The Making of a Dictator* by George Paloczi-Horvath. Mr. Paloczi-Horvath is not a member of the Communist party. He was expelled from the Communist party and arrested in 1949. Released after 5 years in a Communist prison, he refused to rejoin the Party.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

(See also *U.S.S.R. and United States, Foreign Policy.*)

July 17—In 3 separate notes presented to the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France reject Premier Nikita Khrushchev's proposals on Germany and Berlin. The U.S. warns it will defend its rights in Berlin and challenges the Soviet Union to negotiate a German settlement on the basis of self-determination.

July 31—British Deputy Foreign Secretary, Lord Edward Heath, tells Commons Britain is willing to negotiate the Berlin issue with the U.S.S.R. but will not brook any interruption of Western rights in that city. (See also *Disarmament.*)

Disarmament

July 5—A Soviet message to the U.S. and Britain rejects Western proposals on the control organization for a nuclear test ban treaty.

July 15—Britain and the U.S. ask that the U.N. General Assembly take up the deadlock in the nuclear test ban talks.

In answer to the Soviet note of July 5, the U.S. accuses the U.S.S.R. of trying to sabotage nuclear test ban negotiations.

July 17—The U.S. and the Soviet Union resume preliminary talks in Moscow on a general disarmament conference.

July 28—Meeting in Moscow, U.S. and Soviet delegates are unable to resolve differences on arrangements for an international disarmament conference. U.S. representative John J. McCloy talks with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin for 2 hours.

July 29—The U.S.-Soviet disarmament meetings are recessed. McCloy is called home by U.S. President Kennedy to report on his talks earlier this week with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

July 31—McCloy meets with U.S. President Kennedy to report on his meeting with Khrushchev on the Berlin situation.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 18—The 6 Common Market nations agree on an organized system of future political cooperation and consultation. At a meeting in Bonn, the 6 heads of government instruct a working group of high officials to prepare a "European statute" to give the new system of political cooperation a legal basis. (See also *British Commonwealth, Great Britain and Greece.*)

European Free Trade Association

July 3—Tariffs of each of the member countries of the "Outer Seven" drop 10 per cent on imports from fellow members.

July 31—Britain announces that it will seek membership in the Common Market. Denmark and Norway also declare that they will open negotiations on membership in the Common Market. The E.F.T.A. (Outer Seven) announces that its members—Britain, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal plus associate member Finland—will seek "ways and means" with the E.E.C. by which their members "could take part together in a single market. . . ."

European Organization for Space Research

July 5—It is revealed that West Germany has agreed to participate in a 12-nation program to construct launching rockets for satellites. Also participating in the 5-year, \$196 million program are France, Britain, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain.

Gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.)

July 17—The International Textile Conference, sponsored by Gatt, opens in Geneva.

The economic problems involved in textile imports and exports are discussed by representatives of 16 nations, with 7 other countries sending observers.

July 21—A U.S. plan for controlling textile imports is unanimously accepted by the conference. The plan involves a 12-month ceiling on exports at present levels unless importing countries permit higher levels; a special study group to work out long-range answers; and a commitment by nations now imposing quantitative import restrictions on textiles to announce an increase in permitted imports by January 1.

Latin American Free Trade Association

July 24—The 7 nations—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay—of the L.A. Free Trade Association hold their first conference in Montevideo.

Nato

July 23—U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara confers in Paris with top Nato commanders to plan strategy in dealing with the Berlin crisis.

United Nations

July 2—The Security Council meets to consider Kuwait's complaint that Iraq is threatening its territorial integrity. (See also *Kuwait*.)

July 3—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld rejects Soviet demands that U.N. positions be distributed on a political basis. (See also *Soviet Union* and *United States, Foreign Policy*.)

July 4—The U.N. Commission on South-West Africa warns Hammarskjöld that South Africa's administration of the territory has created a "grave situation."

July 7—Russia vetoes a British resolution calling on all nations to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait; the Security Council then defeats a United Arab Republic resolution, supported by Russia, calling for immediate British troop withdrawal from Kuwait.

July 8—The Trusteeship Council votes unanimously to recommend independence for Western Samoa, now governed by New Zealand on behalf of the U.N.

July 10—South Africa informs the U.N. by

letter that it refuses to allow a U.N. committee to enter South-West Africa and will regard any such attempt as involving the U.N. "in an act of aggression." (See also *British Empire, Bechuanaland*.)

July 21—The Security Council meets to consider Tunisian charges of French aggression. (See also *Tunisia*.)

July 22—By a vote of 10 to 0, the Security Council calls for an immediate cease-fire in Tunisia and a return of all forces to the positions occupied before the fighting began.

ARGENTINA

July 17—The General Labor Federation calls a 24-hour general strike to protest increased living costs, working conditions and the arrest of certain labor leaders.

July 21—The U.S. and the International Bank grant Argentina \$204 million in loans for industrial development.

AUSTRIA

July 18—The Cabinet urges the Italian government and the German-speaking terrorists in Alto Adige to abandon force and to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute in South Tyrol.

July 19—Austria asks the U.N. to place the dispute with Italy over Alto Adige on the agenda of the General Assembly. (See also *Italy*.)

July 22—The leading Swiss newspaper charges that Austria's Foreign Minister, Interior Minister and 3 major politicians participated in forming a separatist partisan organization in Alto Adige.

July 26—Foreign Minister Kreisky labels as "slander" the charges that he and others helped organize a separatist movement in Alto Adige.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Australia

July 11—The British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, concludes talks with Australian officials. A joint communiqué says Australia feels Britain should not join the Common Market to achieve European unity "at the cost of division within the Commonwealth or elsewhere in the free world."

Canada

- July 6—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker is denounced by James Coyne as the "evil genius" behind efforts to remove him as Governor of the Bank of Canada.
- July 13—In a revolt against the government, the Senate votes against a bill to remove Coyne from office. Following this "vindication" of his position, Coyne resigns.
- July 14—Duncan Sandys, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, ends two days of talks with Canadian officials. A joint communiqué expresses Canada's "grave concern" over the implications of possible British negotiations for joining the European Common Market.
- July 24—Louis Rasminsky, former deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, is named to head that organization, succeeding James Coyne.

Ceylon

- July 13—Opening the Parliament, Governor General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke says a select committee will be appointed to consider constitutional reforms to establish a republican form of government.
- July 21—The government announces that a curfew imposed in the Eastern and Northern provinces on April 18 has been lifted. But the state of emergency and censorship of news, imposed at that time, are to continue.
- July 27—Parliament's lower house decides to appoint a joint committee to consider establishing a republic for Ceylon.

Ghana

- July 1—President Kwame Nkrumah announces the air force will acquire 45 new planes by the end of the year. He adds that the Navy is acquiring new ships and the army is rapidly expanding and being modernized.
- July 5—The government reveals the U.S. has assured Ghana of assistance in financing the Volta River hydroelectric dam.
- July 9—It is announced that the Soviet Union will help the country give extensive training and short practical industrial courses to organizers and officers of the Ghanaian cooperative movement.

Nkrumah leaves the country on state visits to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Great Britain (See also *Kuwait*.)

- July 1—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan warns the Soviet Union that the West "cannot countenance interference with Allied rights" in Berlin.
- July 4—Macmillan tells Commons that Britain rejects any proposals for the future of Germany and Berlin that do not include German reunification.
- July 5—Queen Elizabeth II confers an earldom on Sir Anthony Eden.
- July 15—Selwyn Lloyd, Chancellor of the Exchequer, warns the British he will invoke unpopular measures to correct present economic trends. He says the main difficulties are that the country is importing more than it is exporting and that prices are rising faster than productivity.
- July 21—19 trade union officials declare that British industries would face a serious threat if Britain joins the Common Market. (See also *Canada*.)
- July 25—Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd introduces his austerity program. It calls for a 10 per cent increase in purchase taxes and a rise in the bank rate from 5 per cent to 7 per cent.
- July 27—Macmillan receives a vote of confidence from Commons on the new austerity program.
- July 28—The High Court of Justice holds that no-one can avoid succession to a peerage; Viscount Stansgate is unable to remain a commoner and cannot hold his seat in the House of Commons.
- July 31—Prime Minister Macmillan tells Commons that Britain will seek membership in the European Common Market; protection for Commonwealth partners and for the other members of the European Free Trade Association (the Outer Seven) is to be guaranteed. (See also *International*, *E.F.T.A.*)

India

- July 1—The government reveals plans to increase local participation in village councils to further grass-roots democracy in rural areas. The aim of the new system of local councils is said to be coordination

of development in agriculture, rural industry and farmer cooperatives.

India and Pakistan agree on procedures for the transfer of millions of rupees left behind by refugees who fled from one country to the other following the 1947 partition.

New Zealand

July 6—After conferring with New Zealand officials, Duncan Sandys declares that Britain, before entering the Common Market, will seek special arrangements to protect Commonwealth countries.

Nigeria

(See also *United States, Foreign Policy.*)

July 17—Jaja Wachuku, former chairman of the U.N. Conciliation Commission on the Congo, is appointed Foreign Minister by Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Bechuanaland

July 9—The British government withdraws permission given the U.N. committee on South-West Africa to visit Bechuanaland. The decision is made after the committee refuses to give assurances it will not try to cross the border into South-West Africa. (See also *United Nations.*)

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

July 23—Voting in an unofficial nationwide referendum organized by the National Democratic party, Southern Rhodesian Africans overwhelmingly reject proposals approved by Britain for a constitution.

July 24—2 natives are killed and 4 wounded in Salisbury as Africans riot against the proposed constitution.

July 26—The predominantly white electorate gives overwhelming approval to a new constitution that will give Africans 15 of the 62 Assembly seats.

Kenya

July 2—The country's African political leaders return after 2 weeks of constitutional talks in Britain. They report that Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod has agreed that representatives of all races and parties should draw up a plan for full internal

self-government headed by an African Prime Minister.

July 17—The Kenya Regiment, an exclusively European territorial force for 25 years, becomes multi-racial; 7 Africans and 6 Asians join the unit. Legislation approved last week permits Africans and Asians to volunteer.

CHILE

July 21—The government announces its new program to gain more control of production and world marketing of copper. It is planned to enforce a progressive increase in mining output, to seek prospective buyers, even behind the Iron Curtain, and to recommend that U.S.-owned companies establish local operations as Chilean enterprises.

CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

July 4—The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade reveals in an official magazine that Communist China owes the U.S.S.R. more than \$300 million because of Peking's failure to meet export commitments to Moscow.

July 9—The government reports new food crises because of drought in eastern China.

July 15—Communist China and North Korea declare that "the main danger to the present international Communist movement" is Yugoslav revisionism. The joint communiqué is broadcast less than 48 hours after the end of a cordial Yugoslav-Soviet meeting in Moscow.

July 24—The Peking radio reports that central China is suffering a serious drought "even worse" than those of the past years.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

July 3—A U.N. spokesman warns that new session of Parliament is "absolute inevitable" since the promise of \$10 million in economic assistance was meant for "the Congo as a whole."

July 4—Katanga's Parliament declares that province will not send delegates to a convened Congo Parliament in Leopoldville, regardless of any agreements Pre

dent Moise Tshombe signed with the central government.

July 17—Leaders of President Kasavubu's central government and Antoine Gizenga's Stanleyville regime hold direct consultations for the first time on convening Parliament.

July 20—The Interior Minister of Katanga, Godefroid Munongo, threatens to call on the Soviet Union for help in the dispute with the central government. He also says Katanga is seeking contacts with Gizenga's Eastern Province regime.

July 23—Kasavubu appeals to Katanga to send representatives to Leopoldville for the coming session of Parliament. He also asks Gizenga to attend in person.

July 24—Katanga's Interior Minister says his government has accepted offers of help from the Soviet Union. Katanga delegates will also visit Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

July 25—Supporters of Gizenga are elected to key parliamentary posts. Joseph Kasongo is reelected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From Stanleyville, Gizenga says he will personally attend the parliamentary meeting.

The U.N. issues an urgent appeal for additional troops to replace the 3,000 Tunisians being recalled.

July 27—The Congolese National Parliament holds its first formal session.

July 31—Lieutenant General Joseph Mobutu, Congolese army leader, is refused entry to Brazzaville, in the neighboring French Congo. Mobutu is prevented from carrying out his mission of arranging a meeting between President Kasavubu and Katanga President Tshombe. Tshombe arrived in Brazzaville for a meeting with Kasavubu 2 days ago.

CUBA

July 8—The Tractors for Freedom Committee formally ends its attempts to exchange 500 agricultural tractors for 1,214 rebel prisoners.

July 24—A U.S. commercial airplane over Florida with 33 passengers and 5 crew members is seized in flight by an armed passenger and forced to land at Havana.

July 25—Passengers and crew of the hijacked plane are released but Premier

Fidel Castro keeps the plane.

July 26—In a speech at a mass rally celebrating the eighth anniversary of his revolutionary movement, Castro says he will continue to permit Cubans to emigrate to the U.S. He demands return of 25 Cuban planes before releasing the U.S. plane.

July 27—U.S. Secretary of State Rusk rejects the Castro plane exchange.

July 29—Cuba, in a note to the U.N. Security Council, declares that it will turn over to the Council the seized U.S. plane.

July 31—Eight of the ten Cuban prisoners who were in the U.S. to negotiate a tractors for prisoners exchange return to Cuba. The other 2 Cuban rebel prisoners defect to the U.S.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE

July 5—3 major political exiles return to test the government's promise that political opposition will be welcome.

July 7—More than 2,000 persons riot against the government after the Dominican Revolutionary party stages its first rally in 30 years.

July 17—A 4-nation investigatory committee of the Organization of American States reports to the O.A.S. Sanctions Committee that surveillance of the Dominican situation should be maintained.

EL SALVADOR

July 1—The Civil-Military Directorate issues a voluminous decree for the "protection of farm workers" and declares the purpose of the law is to further "social justice" as a means of fighting extreme Leftist movements.

July 15—Government and private credits from the U.S. totalling \$32 million are obtained to help stabilize the currency and bolster the economy.

FINLAND

July 14—Martti J. Miettunen, governor of Lapland, is named premier of a new Agrarian minority government. Miettunen succeeds Vieno Sukselainen, who resigned after being found guilty of administrative irregularities.

FRANCE (See also *Tunisia*.)

July 12—In a televised report to the French people, President de Gaulle reasserts France's place in the front rank of those advocating a "hard" line on Berlin.

July 29—French Premier Michel Debré, in a television broadcast, announces new proposals for aiding farmers.

FRANCE OVERSEAS**Algeria**

July 1—Clashes between French security forces and Muslim demonstrators leave 11 dead and 71 wounded. The demonstrations are called by the rebel provisional government in Tunis to protest France's threat to partition Algeria between predominantly European and Muslim areas if peace talks fail.

July 5—A general strike and nationalist demonstrations result in 80 Muslims slain and 266 wounded.

July 20—Rebel and French negotiators resume peace talks after a 5-week recess.

July 28—The French-Algerian peace talks are suspended following a deadlock over the Algerian rebel government's insistence that its claim to the Sahara be recognized.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 12—Despite a Communist warning that such a trip would constitute "provocation," Chancellor Konrad Adenauer flies to Berlin to confer with city officials. They agree that free access to and from Berlin must be unrestricted and that any agreement on Berlin must take into account the wishes of the population there. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

July 20—Willy Brandt, Mayor of West Berlin, discloses that in the first 18 days of the month 15,624 East Germans—twice the average—have registered as refugees in West Berlin. Thousands more have fled to West Germany without having registered.

July 23—At the conclusion of a 5-day rally of the German Evangelical Church, church leaders urge the East Germans, estimated at 11,000, who stole into West Berlin for the event, to return home.

July 24—An estimated 2,000 East Germans

who attended the church rally decide to remain in West Berlin as refugees.

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (East)

July 5—The government announces a major administrative shake-up designed to effect an "urgent solution" for new economic problems.

July 6—Walter Ulbricht warns the East Germans that they may soon have to make "temporary sacrifices." He says his government will not use force to achieve its aims in Berlin. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

July 10—East German officials denounce the idea that their government might serve as an "agent" for the Soviet Union in its guarantee of free Allied access to Berlin under a new Soviet peace treaty with East Germany.

July 14—Officials disclose that restive farmers have threatened to break up collective farms in protest over critical food shortages. Authorities announce the tightening of butter rationing.

July 22—Ulbricht demands increased efforts by farmers to increase food production and warns local party officials not to continue giving falsified reports.

GREECE

July 9—Agreements are signed making Greece an associate member of the 6-nation European Economic Community (Common Market).

GUINEA

July 29—France and Guinea sign a cultural cooperation agreement.

INDONESIA

July 2—President Sukarno returns to Jakarta after a 10-week tour of 20 world capitals. He says his trip has won increased support abroad for Indonesia's claim to Netherlands New Guinea.

IRAN

July 21—Police quell demonstrations against the government by the National Front, which has been demanding new elections and the restoration of Mohammed Mossadegh to power.

IRAQ

July 3—The government denounces British troop landings in Kuwait as “aggression on a part of Iraqi territory” and calls on all Arab nations to support Iraq. (See also *International, U.N. and Kuwait.*)

July 14—In honor of the third anniversary of the revolution that brought him to power, Premier Abdel Karim Kassim orders the release of 4 former premiers.

July 15—Kassim dedicates the first major Iraqi project built with Soviet credit—a 400-watt radio station. He also opens a new block of housing units and the new Baghdad-Kut road, and inaugurates the National Assembly building.

July 20—Accusing the Arab League of aiding “British imperialism,” Iraq walks out of a meeting of that organization when it votes to admit Kuwait to membership.

ISRAEL

July 5—Israel fires an unguided rocket 50 miles into the atmosphere.

July 11—The Church of Christ calls off its services in Jerusalem following stone-throwing attacks by Jewish fanatics.

July 13—Officials assure the U.S. that 2 American missionaries will be given police protection so they can continue their religious activities in Jerusalem.

July 25—Upon completion of the 25-day cross-examination of Adolf Eichmann, the trial is recessed for a week.

July 26—Finance Minister Levi Eshkol outlines an economic growth program requiring \$2.5 billion in investment resources in the next 5 years.

ITALY

July 11—The government announces that all Austrians wishing to visit Italy must have valid passports and visas. (See also *Austria.*)

July 12—An official note from Rome to Vienna charges Austria with moral responsibility in the activities of terrorists who set off 12 explosions last night in Bolzano, capital of Alto Adige.

July 14—A 24-hour nationwide strike of railroad workers begins to protest the government’s failure to enact promised reform of pay and service conditions.

JAPAN

July 18—Premier Hayato Ikeda announces the third cabinet reshuffle since he came to power a year ago. He brings most of his major political rivals into the government.

KOREA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF (North)

July 6—The Soviet Union and North Korea sign a 10-year military assistance treaty. The pact also provides for new Soviet financial credits to North Korea.

July 11—North Korea and Communist China sign a military aid treaty.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

July 3—Lieutenant General Chang Do Young resigns as head of the cabinet and as a member of the ruling military junta, of which he has been chairman. Major General Pak Chung Hi is named chairman of the junta; Defense Minister Song Yo Chan is appointed head of the Cabinet.

July 4—The government accuses former Premier John M. Chang of having collaborated with Left-Wingers and 11 members of his cabinet of aiding Communist plots. Stiff penalties are ordered for all persons suspected of Communist sympathies.

July 9—The government announces that “an anti-revolutionary company” of 45 army officers, including 5 former members of the junta, have been arrested on charges of trying to kill Pak.

July 16—The government announces a series of economic steps to restore the “peace and calm of people’s minds” and inspire public confidence in the nation’s economy.

July 17—1,293 civilian prisoners, arrested after the May 16 coup, are released. Pak reveals that 3,098 suspected pro-Communists were arrested in May and that 1,217 were released earlier.

July 22—An agency to plan, coordinate and oversee all economic policies and programs is established.

KUWAIT (See also *International, United Nations, and Iraq.*)

July 1—British troops, tanks and planes land in Kuwait to counter an Iraqi annexation

threat, at Kuwait's request. The government radio announces Saudi Arabia is sending troops to aid the Sheik's 2,400-man army.

July 6—Britain tells the Security Council that its military forces will leave Kuwait as soon as Iraq drops its claims to the sheikdom.

July 19—Britain begins withdrawal of a large part of its 5,000 troops.

July 20—The Arab League unanimously admits Kuwait to membership after the Iraqi delegation walks out. Kuwait says it will demand withdrawal of British forces as soon as possible.

July 30—A Kuwait spokesman announces plans to arrange for Arab League forces to replace British troops there.

LAOS

July 1—Britain and the Soviet Union agree on instructions for the International Control Commission in Laos to enable it to procure equipment to police the cease-fire.

July 19—The 14-nation conference on Laos ends its deadlock by agreeing to begin point-by-point negotiations in closed sessions.

July 28—The 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos shelves the Communist demand that Seato withdraw its offer to aid Laos.

July 30—The National Assembly amends the constitution to empower King Savang Vathana to name a government without Assembly approval.

MEXICO

July 2—National elections are held for the 178 seats in the House of Deputies. The administration's Revolutionary Constitutional party appears to have won all seats, and the Leftist parties poll less than 1 per cent of the 6 million votes.

July 26—It is reported that the administration of President Adolfo Lopez Mateos has announced that from December, 1958, to August, 1960, over 3 million hectares of land were granted to farmers, under the land reform program.

NEPAL

July 16—The government cancels all political arrest warrants issued on or after

December 15, when King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva suspended parliamentary government. The Minister for Home Affairs outlines plans for a village council form of government, on the lowest levels. A national council will replace the dissolved parliament.

PHILIPPINES, THE

July 3—2 million Filipinos turn out in Manila to greet U.S. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

July 30—It is disclosed that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has announced an \$8.5 million loan to help the Philippines in a port improvement program.

POLAND

July 1—The Central Committee announces detailed measures to decentralize the bureaucracy.

July 15—The Sejm (Parliament) passes new legislation aimed at curtailing activities of the Roman Catholic Church.

PORTUGAL

Angola

July 29—The U.N. Committee investigating the Angola situation, in a progress report to the U.N. Security Council President, declares that the Portuguese authorities would not permit the committee to visit Angola.

SUDAN, THE

July 11—2 former premiers and 4 other former top officials are arrested for conspiracy against the state.

July 30—It is announced that the U.S.S.R. will grant a 20 million ruble credit to the Sudan for development projects.

THAILAND

July 31—Ending a 2-day conference, Malayan Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman and Philippine Foreign Minister Felixberto M. Serrano issue a joint communiqué. The 3 leaders declare that they have formed the Association of Southeast Asia, to promote closer economic, cultural and other ties among the non-Communist nations of the area.

TUNISIA

July 6—President Habib Bourguiba sends a letter to French President de Gaulle asking him to accept the principle of French evacuation of the Bizerte naval air base. He also demands a strip of territory 28 miles wide south of Tunisia's present Saharan border. France retains its rights in Bizerte under a 1957 treaty.

July 17—Bourguiba gives France 24 hours to promise to evacuate Bizerte and accept his claim to part of the Sahara. He tells the National Assembly that if Paris gives no satisfactory reply Tunisians will surround and blockade the base, and forces will march into the Sahara.

July 18—De Gaulle warns Bourguiba that force will be met with force and that the present atmosphere is not conducive for a discussion of the status of Bizerte and of Tunisia's southern boundary.

July 19—Tunisian troops and civilians surround the Bizerte base; volunteers move into the Sahara. French paratroopers are flown from Algeria to reinforce the base; Tunisians open fire on the French planes. The French garrison exchanges gunfire with besieging forces.

July 20—As bitter fighting continues, Tunisian sources say 150 of their nationals have been killed. France, in a note the Tunisian government refuses to accept, declares it is willing to discuss conditions for an immediate cease-fire.

Tunisia accuses France of aggression and calls on the U.N. Security Council to demand immediate French evacuation.

Tunisia's Ambassador to the U.S. rejects a strong United States appeal to settle the Bizerte issue outside the U.N.

July 21—Following heavy casualties on both sides, French forces capture the city of Bizerte.

July 22—Both sides cease military operations. Bourguiba declares Tunisia will continue to insist on French withdrawal from the city and the naval base. (See also *International, U.N.*)

July 24—Habib Bourguiba, Jr., ambassador to the U.S., challenges the Western world to come to Tunisia's aid "before another world does."

U.N. Secretary General Dag Ham-

marskjold arrives in Tunis at the invitation of the Tunisians to seek a solution for the impasse caused by French military occupation of the Bizerte area.

July 25—Bourguiba calls on border nations and friendly powers to send him arms and guerrilla fighters.

July 26—France accuses Hammarskjold of a bias in Tunisia's favor and ignores a hint that the U.N. official would like to visit Paris to discuss the situation with French officials.

July 27—Hammarskjold ends his visit.

July 28—Hammarskjold tells the U.N. Security Council that the French troops policing Bizerte were violating Tunisian sovereignty and the U.N. cease-fire resolution on Tunisia. France maintains that it has not violated the cease-fire, but refuses to withdraw its troops.

July 29—Secretary General of the Arab League Abdel Khalik Hassouna meets with Tunisian officials on Bizerte.

Liberia asks for a special session of the General Assembly following Security Council failure to agree on a new resolution for handling Tunisian-French differences. Three resolutions on Bizerte were defeated by the Council.

July 31—The Afro-Asian bloc in the U.N. reports that it is petitioning to gain the 50 necessary signatures to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly to discuss the Tunisian situation.

TURKEY

July 9—75 per cent of the nation's eligible 13.5 million voters participate in a referendum on a new constitution.

July 14—The government announces that 6.3 million voters favored the new constitution and that 3.9 million voted against it. The new document includes a series of checks and balances to guard against executive privileges. A bicameral legislature will be composed of a National Assembly and a Republican Senate. The Constitution also provides for a president and vice-president.

July 31—The National Unity Committee, the governing junta of Turkey, extends martial law to all of Turkey. Martial law has been in effect in Ankara and Istanbul since the May coup.

U.S.S.R.

July 6—Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky discloses that Soviet armed forces are being reorganized, with special emphasis on equipment of all units with rocket weapons and formation of small independent nuclear detachments.

July 8—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev suspends the planned reduction in armed forces and calls for a 3-million-ruble increase in this year's defense budget.

July 9—In Aviation Day celebrations, new supersonic jet fighters and bombers are displayed. On exhibit are at least 11 new combat aircraft.

July 11—Khrushchev warns that the U.S.S.R. will use force to resist any U.N. decision threatening its security. He renews a demand for reorganization of the U.N. Secretariat, replacing the Secretary General with a triumvirate. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis, United Nations and United States, Foreign Policy.*)

July 17—U.N. figures reveal that Soviet trade with the non-Communist world almost doubled from 1955 to 1959, from \$1.4 billion to \$2.6 billion. Soviet exports to non-Communist countries rose by 90 per cent and imports by 100 per cent, while Soviet exports to Communist countries rose 51 per cent and imports 56 per cent.

July 21—*Izvestia* declares the Soviet Union has a larger and faster set of rocket-launching nuclear submarines than the U.S.

July 23—The government terms U.S. launchings of 2 experimental observation satellites acts of espionage and aggression.

The government establishes control commissions with extraordinary powers to deal with false economic reporting by agricultural and industrial managers.

July 25—Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah ends a 15-day visit to the Soviet Union.

July 30—*Pravda* (Communist newspaper) publishes the draft of the third Soviet party program, to be submitted to the twenty-second party congress in October. The draft program announces that the "cultural and technical standards [of the Soviet people] will improve substantially." The program rules out thermonuclear war and reaffirms the policy of peaceful co-existence.

UNITED STATES, THE

Agriculture

July 26—The Senate passes the omnibus farm bill to subsidize reduced acreage in wheat, corn, barley and grain sorghum.

July 27—The House passes the omnibus farm bill after stipulating that subsidized crops can be sent only to friendly nations.

Civil Rights

July 6—The Justice Department files 2 suits in Mississippi charging that Negroes in 2 counties have been denied voting rights.

July 11—The Justice Department files suit in Louisiana charging a White Citizens Council and a county registrar with illegally purging 4,800 Negroes from voting rolls over the past 5 years.

The Economy

July 5—The Labor Department reports that both employment and unemployment rose in June, with 68.7 million employed and 5.6 million seeking employment.

July 6—Fiscal 1961, ending June 30, shows the federal debt at \$289 billion.

July 19—Kennedy reports production of goods and services at an annual rate of \$515 billion.

July 25—It is reported that the June Consumer Price Index rose two-tenths of 1 per cent to a new high of 127.6.

Foreign Policy

July 2—The U.S. announces approval of the first Alliance for Progress projects. The projects will provide \$3.7 million in social welfare funds for Panama, Guatemala and Argentina.

July 8—It is revealed that Outer Mongolia last month informed the U.S. she is ready to establish diplomatic relations.

July 11—President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan arrives in Washington for a state visit.

July 12—Pakistan's President Ayub warns a joint session of Congress of the consequences of ending or curtailing the foreign aid program.

July 13—Ayub warns that any U.S. military assistance to India "would put a strain on our relations with America." He says he hopes the U.S. will help Pakistan solve her population problems. He holds out hope for free elections next year.

July 14—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk declares the U.S. will use its veto to block Khrushchev's proposal to replace the U.N. Secretary General with a 3-member directorate. (See also *International, United Nations*, and *U.S.S.R.*)

July 16—Senator Fulbright, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman, urges the neutral nations of Asia and Africa to speak out in defense of self-determination for all peoples. He says such a firm declaration may play a major role in stemming the Berlin crisis.

July 17—Tanganyika's Prime Minister Julius Nyerere talks with Kennedy and receives assurance of economic aid.

July 19—Kennedy says the U.S. will call upon its Western allies for increased defense measures in the Berlin crisis. He puts full responsibility on Khrushchev if war should break out over Berlin. (See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

July 22—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara leaves for Europe to confer with Nato officials on increased defenses for Berlin. (See also *International, Nato*.)

July 25—Kennedy tells the nation the U.S. will fight if necessary to preserve its rights in Berlin. (See also *United States, Government*.)

Kennedy confers with Nigerian Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in Washington on a state visit.

July 28—The Senate, 76-0, adopts a resolution opposing U.S. recognition of Communist China or U.N. membership for that nation.

July 31—Kennedy meets with Nationalist Chinese Premier Chen Cheng; assurances of mutual support are given.

Government

July 11—The T.V.A. announces a reduction in electric rates to residential and commercial customers of at least 8 per cent.

July 13—Dr. Robert Soblen is found guilty of wartime espionage.

July 14—The Senate passes a House-approved measure for a \$570 million program to expand control of water pollution.

Ben David Dorfman, an exponent of liberalized international trade, is appointed to the U.S. Tariff Commission.

The Senate confirms the appointment

of Robert Woodward as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Mayor deLesseps Morrison of New Orleans as U.S. Ambassador to the O.A.S.

July 17—Frank Pace, former Secretary of the Army, is named to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

July 18—The Administration's \$2.4 billion school-aid bill is shelved for this congressional session; the House Rules Committee votes 8 to 7 to table the measure.

The Senate votes approval of the Administration's proposal to build the world's largest nuclear power plant in conjunction with a new plutonium-production reactor at Hanford, Washington. The bill was defeated on July 13 by the House. The bill now goes to a Senate-House conference committee.

July 19—Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, says that cities have long had the right to put able-bodied relief recipients to work so long as federal aid is not involved.

A Senate-House conference committee agrees to give the Administration the \$1.7 billion it asks to speed the race to put a man on the moon.

July 20—By executive order, the President shifts responsibility for civil defense from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization to the Defense Department.

The government reports that the budget deficit in the fiscal year ending June 30 was \$3.9 billion, or \$1.7 billion higher than estimated.

Both houses of Congress vote to give the National Aeronautics and Space Administration \$1.7 billion to spend this year, including \$10 million for its man-on-the-moon project.

The House kills the Administration's reorganization proposal for the National Labor Relations Board.

July 24—The Administration proposes private ownership and operation of a communications satellite system capable of joining "the farthest corners of the globe."

July 25—The Federal Communications Commission urges 9 companies engaged in international communications to organize a joint venture that would own and operate a communications satellite system.

Addressing the nation on the Berlin

crisis, Kennedy asks Congress for \$3.5 billion more in defense, for an increase in the standing army, and for authority to call up some reserve units. He says draft calls will be doubled and tripled in the months ahead, and asks for \$207 million for civil defense.

July 26—Congress receives Kennedy's plans for the armed forces build-up announced in his speech. He asks for an additional \$3.4 billion in defense appropriations and stand-by authority to call up Reservists.

July 27—An amended reorganization plan for the F.C.C. is approved by the Senate.

The Senate passes a bill cutting from \$500 to \$100 the amount of foreign goods a tourist may bring in duty-free.

July 28—The Senate approves Kennedy's program for an arms and troop strength build-up. Almost \$1 billion additional is authorized for purchases of weapons and other equipment. The Senate also votes to increase the army to 1 million men.

July 31—Voting 403 to 2, the House sends a bill to the White House authorizing the President to call 250,000 reservists to active duty.

Philleo Nash is named Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Labor

July 3—The 18-day maritime strike is temporarily ended under a Taft-Hartley injunction issued at President Kennedy's request.

July 7—The International Brotherhood of Teamsters convention re-elects President James Hoffa.

July 28—The American Motors Corporation offers the United Automobile Workers a 3-year contract providing for annual pay increases of 7 cents an hour plus a profit sharing plan.

Military Policy

July 13—Two experimental satellites are successfully placed in orbit. One is designed to spot hurricanes and the other to detect missile firings. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

July 21—Captain Virgil Grissom makes the second U.S. suborbital flight, reaching an altitude of 118 miles and traveling 303 miles in 16 minutes. The capsule sinks in the Atlantic Ocean before it can be re-

covered by helicopters because the side hatch blew off. Grissom is in excellent condition.

July 25—Scientists tell the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy no solution is in sight for developing reliable methods of detecting clandestine nuclear explosions underground or in space.

Segregation

July 12—8 major defense contractors sign agreements aimed at improving Negroes' access to jobs and promotions.

July 19—Kennedy tells a news conference he endorses the right of citizens to move in interstate commerce "for whatever reasons they travel."

July 26—The Justice Department files suit demanding that Negroes be allowed to use all facilities at the municipal airport at Montgomery, Alabama.

VATICAN, THE

July 14—Pope John XXIII issues a social encyclical stressing the need to search for social justice and condemning materialism. He appeals for aid to under-developed areas and asks that workers be given a greater voice in industry at all levels.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

July 16—Government troops crush a Communist force and kill 185 guerrillas in the largest battle since the country became independent.

July 18—The U.S. and South Vietnam reach a "standby agreement" for a crash program to re-establish the internal security of the country and aid rural settlements.

July 29—Communist rebels renew attacks. They are north of Saigon, the closest they have been to the capital.

YUGOSLAVIA

July 13—Foreign Minister Koca Popovic leaves Russia after a week's state visit. A joint communiqué expresses satisfaction at improved relations between the two countries and the hope that increased cooperation will continue. (See also *China*.)

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